While I've been putting together concepts for the Realm of Sejhat, I've found myself looking pretty extensively into the era of gunpowder warfare, how nations transitioned into it, and how eventually this early form of 'modern' warfare ultimately influenced what we understand about militaries today. It's a pretty fascinating study, but it occurs to me that some of the habits of this style of fighting must seem bewildering to outsiders. Thus, here's a little question/answer on the subject.

Q: When did gunpowder arrive in the West?

A: It's fairly well known that the Chinese first developed and used gunpowder weaponry in combat, but its widespread use in battle as we know it throughout much of the West and the Near East traces its origins back roughly to the 12th century. Cannons, followed by hand cannons (a primitive precursor to a musket) first appeared in the Muslim world, then infiltrated Europe through Spain.

Q: Why did gunpowder weaponry hold appeal?

A: Initially gunpowder held a lot of interest to Muslims and Christians alike because of the properties of bombards, or early cannons. In an era of lofty castles, cannons and their ability to reduce high walls to rubble made old fortifications obsolete and gave tremendous power to those who could afford these ungainly siege weapons. Hand cannons, followed by arquebuses, then muskets are a slightly more difficult topic. At the time, crossbows, recurve bows, and longbows were the most effective infantry missile weapons available. While these bows had shortcomings of their own, firearms had both the ability to pierce heavy armor effectively as well as an air of distinction. As new, expensive weapons and powerful symbols of prestige their demand and presence gradually increased on battlefields.

Q: What were 'line infantry'?

A: Line infantry fought in regiments, or their equivalents, and were the basic infantry unit during the early modern era of combat. The term 'line infantry' can be misleading, since line infantry units did not always fight while drawn into lines of battle. They often marched in columns, and sometimes attacked in columns as well.

Q: Why did infantry march in tight formations, even under cannon and musket fire?

A: The poignant image of musketeers marching into near certain death with men dropping all around seems like an embodiment of military lunacy, but tradition, the nature of combat itself, and circumstance forced regiments and armies to adopt close knit formations. In the early periods of gunpowder combat musketeers were typically accompanied by pikemen, soldiers who carried long spears (10 to 25 feet) to stave off enemy cavalry and infantry and protect the gunners. This required close coordination and tight formation, since cavalry and infantry excel against loose or disorganized groups of soldiers. Even after the pike became obsolete, thanks to the bayonet, infantry continued to march in close formation so that officers could coordinate their movements. Tight formations also helped prevent the very real threats of routing and desertion.

Q: Why did the British Infantry wear such loud red coats?

A: The 'red coats' hail from the English Civil War, when the Parliamentarian Army reorganized in 1645. The army was called the "New Model Army", and was equipped with standardized musketry and uniforms. Since red dye was the cheapest currently available, it was used as the primary color for the uniforms, and while the New Model Army was disbanded in 1660, after the Restoration, the color never disappeared. It became a distinctive symbol of the British Army and the Empire itself.

Q: OK, but why all the gaudy uniforms, brass buttons, and visible colors? Every army in Europe seemed to have these!

A: European governments were notorious copycats, and this didn't exclude soldiers in the Americas either. If an army exhibited valor and a string of impressive victories, you could be sure that within a decade their styles of uniforms and tactics would have been adopted by many of their neighbors. In the ever-present quest to keep up with the Joneses, most militaries pursued fashion trends just as clothing outlets do now.

Q: And the tall hats?

A: The most common hat throughout much of the 18th and part of the 19th centuries was the 'tricorne', or tri-cornered hat. However, elite units such as grenadiers wore hats that emphasized their impressive stature, and an already tall man wearing an enormous hat was believed to impress fear upon the enemy- the tall hats meant crack troops. The common big hat early on was the Mitre, which is equivalent to what the Pope wears. A variation on the mitre, the 'bearskin', is still famously worn by the guards at Buckingham Palace. Other popular tall hats included the 'Shako', of Hungarian origin, the 'Czapka', of Polish origin, and the Top Hat, which was worn by elites and irregulars alike in various nations.

Q: Did the Europeans learn anything at all from fighting in the Americas?

A: Actually, yes, but not just the Americas. Fighting in the rugged Balkans also necessitated a new variety of tactics for dealing with thickly wooded, rocky, or otherwise poor terrain for rigid formations. As such, the French (Voltigeurs, Chasseurs, Tirailleurs), Austrians (Schuetzen, Jaegers, Grenzers, Pandours), Portuguese (Cazadores), and Spanish (Guerillas) were some of the first armies to field sizeable forces of light infantry or 'irregular' infantry, soldiers who used any available cover to aim at and attempt to snipe the enemy. The British also had some notable regiments of light infantry and used them extensively, but were initially slow to appreciate the concept.

Q: Wait, 'snipe'? With a musket? I thought they were inaccurate.

A: Muskets were inherently inaccurate, and this was largely due to the fact that the musket balls did not tightly fit into the barrels of muskets, creating 'windage', or a gap between bullet and barrel. Cannon balls and muskets alike had to deal with the problem of their projectiles bouncing off the walls of the barrel and altering their trajectories. This inherent inaccuracy meant that muskets, while capable of killing people at 200-300 yards, were mainly effective within 50 yards.

Even so, simply firing in the direction of the enemy or actually taking aim first produce very different results. An aimed shot sometimes had a better chance of hitting a target at longer ranges than an entire volley. Additionally, many light infantry were equipped with rifles, which were capable of hitting targets reliably at 200 yards.

Q: If rifles were more accurate, why weren't they more common?

A: Rifles could not be reloaded as rapidly as muskets and were prohibitively expensive to be carried as uniform weaponry- at least, until the latter half of the 19th century. While a musket ball simply rolls down the barrel, a rifle shot has to be 'fitted' into the grooves of the rifling, which often meant forcing or hammering the ball down the barrel, a time consuming process. Even so, riflemen could be exceedingly effective light infantry forces, as the soldiers were trained to aim for officers, sergeants, and vital personnel and could ruin enemy morale.

Q: What ended the era of line infantry combat?

A: A confluence of new technologies throughout the latter half of the 19th century made massed infantry tactics dangerously obsolete. The U.S. Civil War proved for the first time on a large scale that rifles could be supplied to standard infantrymen, and the effect was murderous. Exploding artillery shells became more sophisticated, making tightly packed formations very inadvisable. Metal cartridges and new reloading mechanisms made both infantry weapons and artillery infinitely more lethal. A final nail in the coffin of the line infantry may have been the invention of Cordite, or smokeless gunpowder.

Q: What's so special about Cordite?

A: In your typical gunpowder battle the battlefield itself became obscured by plumes of smoke, especially if the air was reasonably still. Smoke helped cover the movement of infantry across a battlefield and would naturally cover their approach so that they could get close enough to the enemy to rip them apart with musket fire. Smoke was also bad for artillery crews, since they depended on visibility to determine where to fire, what to fire, and what charge to use. Early machine guns like the Gatling Gun and the Mitrailleuse were not immune to this problem, but Cordite changed that.

Cordite lifted much of the smoke from the battlefield. Artillerists could now see where they were shooting and the machine gun suddenly became a truly fearsome weapon to contend with.

Q: Why weren't infantry taught how to aim?

A: Some were. The British Army, on top of being well-disciplined and capable of firing rapidly, also were generally better shots due to the simple fact that they had target practice. French and German forces also invested somewhat in shooting practice for their line units. Spanish, Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman units tended not to have much in the way of live fire training at all. There is a single fundamental reason behind all of this, and that is money.

Britain and France were, throughout much of the 18th and 19th centuries, the wealthiest nations in Europe and could lavish their forces with spare ammunition and gunpowder in order to train in marksmanship. Prussia, while not as wealthy, was a militaristic society and willing to make enormous per capita investments in their army. As such, not only were their soldiers issued with more ammunition, but also more training than most armies. In the Napoleonic Wars British foot, French fusiliers, and Prussian infantrymen each carried about 30 rounds of ammunition into combat. By contrast, Austrian and Russian infantry typically carried about 6 rounds each into combat. Austria and Russia, while populous nations, did not have the same robust economies as their rivals. Many soldiers would only fire one shot a year outside of combat, sometimes never. Without training, the accuracy of their fire suffered. Just as with any other implement, training time translated to skill.

Light infantry were always an exception. They were generally selected as individuals with previous musketry skill, particularly as hunters. Those light infantry without prior marksman experience, such as the Guerillas, had to learn on the job or die trying.