King Albert's War Diary 1/5 • Tribute
a year ago
In honor of the 114th anniversary of our accession, we are pleased to share the entries of our war diary.
We dedicate this to brother Antoine from our previous life and our faithful canine companion Hannah.
During the time when I occupied the Chair of History at the Ecole de Guerre, King Albert began to take an interest in my studies, which he continued to follow as the publication of foreign archives gradually revealed the true features of the Great War. In the course of his daily afternoon walk or of evenings alone together in his magnificent study at Laeken he would enjoy recalling his wartime memories, always accurately placing each reminiscence in its context as experienced, passing through a sieve an inexact version and commenting with humour on the behaviour of some well-known character or the turn of an incident. Without a trace of self-satisfaction, other than that of a duty done, he could maintain that under his aegis as Commander-in-Chief the Belgian Army had played the role demanded of it for fifty-three months. His conscience could congratulate itself all the more in that this goal had been achieved without costing his soldiers more than normal sacrifices, especially since besides the struggle against the invader he had at times to defend our attitude against the requests of the allies, not to mention resisting certain impulsive tendencies on the part of a government living in exile, exacerbated by a long train of alternate hopes and disappointments.
One evening in 1932 His Majesty said to me:
"Later the truth must be known. I shall entrust these notes to you, and I know that you will make good use of them."
At the same time, he handed me two notebooks bound in a blue gilt-edged morocco, one of which had a lock and key. It was the war diary of the King, written in his own hand, which I have produced here in its entirety. The pages of the manuscript do not follow regularly the train of events, and the reader would perhaps find it difficult to enjoy their full significance had not some editorship been undertaken. I have therefore thought it correct, having personal memories at my disposal and possessing original complementary documents, to insert them in a general succinct framework which will bring to light the continuity of our war policy through the vicissitudes of the years 1915-1918, and allow a clear appreciation of the wisdom and purpose with which the King conducted it. Any other use of the royal manuscript would appear to entail a risk of distorting the truth and of diminishing its impact.
R. Van Overstraeten
The campaign of 1914 in Belgium- The state of the Belgian Army at the conclusion of the Battle of the Yser- The military and political standpoint of the King.
The invasion of the 4th August 1914, famous for the rapid attack on Liege, struck Belgium at a time of full military reorganisation. In conformity with the Constitution, King Albert nevertheless assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which, apart from the three fortresses of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp, comprised only 117,000 field troops. Invoking the Treaty of 1839 which placed the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Great Powers, the King asked help of France and Great Britain with a view to "a concerted and common action to repel the invader". Londer and Paris replied immediately that they would honour their obligations, and so on the 20th August the leading French and English columns entered Belgium, on a line from Mons to Arlon. In the meanwhile, the last forts of Liege having succumbed beneath the blows of an irresistible artillery, the hoardes of the German armies overwhelmed central Belgium and Brussels with the 13th Army Corps of von Kluck and von Bulow, while in the Ardennes the 13th Corps of the 3rd, 4th. and 5th Armies took up a position on the Dinant Arlon front. Outstripped by this avalanche, the Allies avoided encirclement and retired southwards, while the isolated Belgian Army fell back on Antwerp. It did not remain inactive, and helped in the victory of the Marne by its sorties of the 7th, 8th, and 9th September, which immobilised opposite it the equivalent of three Army Corps.
In order to remove this intolerable threat to their lines of communication, the Germans had recourse to the fabulous 380 and 420-cm. mortars of the Beseler Army, which pulverised the forts of Antwerp, as they had already done those of Liege and Namur. Almost the only man, apart from King Albert, to realise the importance of this fortress to the Allies was Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who rushed a naval brigade to Antwerp and promised further aid. Too late. Avoiding imminent encirclement, the Belgian Army slipped along the Dutch Frontier and, supported by Admiral Ronarch's Brigade of Fusiliers Marins and by the 7th British Infantry Division took up positions on the Yser from Nieuport to Ypres, at a time when the French part of the Allied front stretched from Arras to Lille. Beseler did not wait to pursue, and the arrival of four fresh Army Corps from Germany unleashed the furious battle for Calais, whose weight was initially brought to bear on the Belgian Front. The King now conveyed to his troops that the last ditch had been reached and warned his officers that he would tolerate no orders to retreat. After eight days of bitter struggle, on the 31st of October the last German assault was halted by the floods which were ably let loose at the decisive moment.
The King looked upon this as a major victory because it ensured the maintenance of the Army on national soil. He personally refused to follow the government to France and installed himself, and Queen Elisabeth, in a modest villa at La Panne. At the close of the Battle of the Yser on the 31st of October, the Belgian Army consisted of no more than 65,000 men, 32,000 being infantry. Many of the guns needed overhauling, and the supply of ammunition rested entirely on weak French deliveries. The reduction of effectives necessitated a general reorganisation involving the suppression of infantry regiments and the regrouping of the divisional artillery. The battles had reduced the strength of the cadres, revealed weaknesses in some, and brought out remarkable qualities in others. Gaps had to be filled, promotions to be made, bravery rewarded and the higher commands entrusted to the best men. It was also important to establish the Army in its positions, to improve the trenches improvised during the course of fluctuating battles, and to transform them into a coherent system of defence.
We lacked material; our equipment was inadequate, our machine-guns insufficient and our heavy artillery non-existent- deficiencies which called for all our efforts and could only be overcome slowly. Fortunately behind the lines, stationed in France, we had at our disposal a reserve made up of militiamen of the 1914 class, increased by many volunteers. These had to be carefully trained and prepared to enter the front lines during the spring, which would double the numerical strength of the units. The addition of this enthusiastic youth to the old veterans would infuse the Army with a new ideal and strengthen our co-operation in the "concerted and common action" to continue with the Allied Powers. This co-operation was to be, as before, loyal and in proportion to our means, and conditional, in any case, on reasonable undertakings; the blood of our soldiers, that precious capital, was not to be shed except to good purpose. The great battle of Flanders came to an end at the sea, It was concluded with a balance of forces on the Western Front and grievous casualties on both sides. Winter, far from favourable to military operations on northern battlefields, would, we hoped, be a period of calm from which we could profit to dig in on the Yser position, a natural entrenched camp on home soil, where we must hang on without thought of retirement, whatever happened. In the domain of general politics, our ambitions must not be confused with those of the Allies. The latter, with their immense resources, could envisage revenges, conquests and annexations. Belgium was fighting for her honour and independence. Reduced to her little army, she could not afford to gamble with it other than parsimoniously. Furthermore, she had every right to fear a reconquest foot by foot, which would lay her country in ruins. Finally, from a world point of view, it was supremely desirable that the war should end with a lasting peace. The restitution of usurped annexations, and the eradication by just preventive action of foments of revenge or dissatisfied irredentism, should form the basis of a peace to be negotiated in a balanced spirit of justice for the good of humanity as a whole.
Such were the general views which guided the King's mind and governed his actions from the day after the harsh battle which halted the invader and brought glory to our standards. The realisation of this very natural programme clearly could not be carried out without difficulties and frequent dissensions. The experience of the first months of the campaign suggested that it would not always be easy to recommend such principles to the Grench Command, whose doctrines and love of the offensive inspired distrust; or to the Belgian government, occasionally subject as it was both to pusillanimity and braggadocio; or even to our General Staff, with its inclination to yield to Allied requests out of amour propre, a spirit of comradeship, or eagerness for action. With his lucid integrity and his imperturbable calm, the King yet managed to avoid all the shoals and, while retaining general respect, to bring his vessel safely to port.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1915
The King opposes any interference with his Command or with the autonomy of the Belgian Army- The Nieuport offensive- The bridgehead south of Dixmude- The King dispels his ministers' illusions- The battle of Steenstraet- The bridgehead north of Dixmude- First Artois offensive- The King reveals his views to General Foch on the offensive to be waged in the West- Second Artois offensive- The defence organisation of the Belgian front- The Yser position, the Belgian entrenched camp to be defended to the end- The Commander-in-Cheif's visits to the trenches- The King's visit to the French front- The great September Allied offensive- The war in the Balkans- Belgium must remain neutral outside the London Pact.
The first open trust came from our friends and attacked a fundamental principle. From their contact with our troops in battle, the Allies had gained the impression that our higher commanders lacked both ability and energy. On the 19th November General Foch used this argument when he proposed to transfer four of our divisions to the Ypres sector, or else to distribute our units among the French forces in the proportion of one brigade per division. At the moment the Belgians were holding the front from the sea to Dixmude. The King would neither agree to being deprived of his constitutional prerogatives, nor let his Army be split up, nor deliver the fate of his soldiers to decisions of foreign authorities beyond his control. He sent the following reply by his Chief of Staff:
The Belgian Army must remain intact, master of its own operations and absolute master of its organisation. It will adapt its movements to those of the Allies. When they take the offensive it will follow suit. Its past and the services it has rendered will vouch for it.
A few days later the chief of the English military mission, on behalf of Marshal French, transmitted a proposal which was just as off-hand: "On the next arrival of British reinforcements, the British, with the co-operation of the Belgian Army, will take over the whole line extending from La Bassee to the sea. Field-Marshal French has asked whether the Belgian Army undertakes to stand fast even without being behind the flooded area and to be able to take the offensive. If the answer is in the affirmative, a sector will be given to the Belgian Army; if in the negative, your Army will be incorporated into the British Army, one brigade per British division."
On the 1st January, the King replied personally to the British Commander-in-Chief:Dear Field-Marshal, I am perfectly well aware of the laudable motive which dictated the steps Colonel Bridges took in your name with intent to distribute certain divisions of the Belgian Army among those of the British Army; in this manner you count upon obtaining a greater return from the whole. I very much doubt if the result can be achieved in this manner. Rivalries would quickly spring up between the two armies; officers and soldiers would be reluctant to obey foreign leaders. From another point of view, that of national unity, the measure proposed is quite unacceptable. My country can only make its existence felt thought its Army and it would never understand a change which would be equivalent to suppressing the latter. Neither I nor my Government, whom I have consulted on this subject, find ourselves able to agree. I propose to carry out radical changes in our High Command, and I think I can give the assurance that the Belgian Army will be capable of holding a position in the line proportionate to its effectives. Within the limits of the preservation of its autonomy, I furthermore declare myself ready to accept any proposal for extending the front or any other which comes within the general plan.Following upon this, addressing the new Divisional Commanders of his choice, he made the following recommendations:The Army, side by side with the neighbouring armies, may be called upon to carry out offensive or defensive operations which will demand far greater efforts than in the past. Can you undertake these operations? As far as your subordinate officers are concerned, choose those who combine the indispensable qualities. He is a criminal who does not sacrifice an incompetent officer... I want divisions on which one can count; the existence of our country depends upon it.The Allies abided by this. The English, short of artillery, merely asked that a regiment of this arm should be placed at their disposal for the defence of the Ypres salient. This request was immediately granted. Later, they were to congratulate us on the brilliant services rendered by this unit. In the meantime, the Allied Command had no intention of leaving us inactive. From the month of December onwards, we were told to prepare ourselves for an operation which, launched from Nieuport, would disengage the Yser Front and the Belgian coast. In the eyes of the King this was wishful thinking. The density of the enemy forces in Flanders, the impracticability of the terrain, and the material distress of our Army excluded any chance of a favourable advance. Nevertheless, to support the French troops under General de Miltry, who had to open the way along the sea, he agreed to an extension of our front as far as the Fort of Knocke and to support the French attack on St. Georges with a few of our left-flank battalions. Requested in addition to stage an offensive, the King decided, under cover of raids on isolated positions in the flooded area, to form a bridgehead in the elbow of the Yser to the south of Dixmude, a tactic designed to impress both the Germans and the Allies on account of the threat to Dixmude. Launched on the 21st December, the operation was a complete success, without exaggerated casualties. our light infantry stood fast against enemy counter-attack. The effect produced by this incident had more repercussions than the bloody assaults of several Zouave regiments in the sand dunes of Lombardzyde. From the 20th January onwards our front was lengthened as far as the Maison du Passeur. On the 24th February there was a question of stretching it still further, perhaps as far as Langemarck. Of the extra five miles, two were covered by the canal; the others, from Steenstraet to Langemarck, were part of the Ypres salient and were protected by no obstacle. The King agreed to help General Joffre, who was organising an offensive to be launched this time between Verdun and Rheims; nevertheless, he estimated it premature to commit our troops to the defence of a sector whose outline suggested it would be the object of an enemy attack. He accepted the extension only as far as Steenstraet. It was lucky for us; it was against this sector that the Germans were preparing the poison-gas attack which took the Allies by surprise on the 22nd April.
On the other hand, this new extension allowed us to decline on the 9th March the request of Field-Marshal French to place one of our divisions in reserve behind the British Army for the Neuve Chapelle offensive. The King considered this enterprise doomed to failure and that we should support it merely by local demonstrations. Everything indicated, in fact, that the forces which faced us were not inferior in number and that they were better equipped. As a proof of this on the 8th April the Germans captured from us the post of Drie Grachten; a few days later an advance post further south, to the east of the Ypres Canal, suffered the same fate. Moreover, in Woevre an encircling movement undertaken by the French on the two walls of the Saint-Mihiel "hernia" achieved no success. The King noted in his diary:14th April
We learn that the Meuse-Moselle offensive has come to a standstill. The smoothing out of the line between Verdun and Pont-a-Mousson has therefore not been accomplished. I am more and more convinced that the present line will not move and that peace will be negotiated on today's positions, which in any case are the same as they were six months ago.A few days earlier, the 5th April, at La Panne, on the lines of his own presentation to the Grenadier Regiment, of which Leopold II was once Honorary Colonel, he insisted on personally presenting His Royal Highness Prince Leopold to the 12th Regiment of the Line. After evoking the brilliant record of this unit, he concluded:[/quote]I have assembled you today to present my young son to you. The reason I have chosen the 12th Regiment of the Line to instruct him in the profession of arms is because this regiment has particularly distinguished itself by its valour in the course of the campaign. By placing my son in this regiment I am pleased to give you a token of my entire confidence. Princes must be brought up early in the school of duty, and there exists none better than an army like ours, which heroically personifies the nation. My son has claimed the honour of wearing the uniform of our valiant soldiers. He will be very proud to belong to a regiment whose acts of bravery and of devotion to our country will form a glorious page in our national history.[/quote]In the meanwhile, it came to the ears of the Commander-in-Chief that various members of the Government were harbouring pretentious illusions, which certain journalists even attributed to the Chef de Cabinet, as a regards the peace terms to be imposed on Germany. Our war policy had to be agreed and, once agreed, pursued in common accord by Government and Sovereign. The King attached the greatest importance to the observance of this principle. He therefore hastily convened the ministers to sound them and to influence them towards moderation. He tells of this meeting in his diary:7th April
Cabinet meeting.
I propose first of all to discuss the question of peace and the conditions preliminary to this. M. van de Vijvere considers the economic point of view to be of prime importance. If our national debt is not doubled we shall come through. He is of the opinion that we should accept territorial aggrandisements if they are proposed to us. I point out that the question of maintaining or not maintaining our neutrality must be solved before everything, as it governs our political orientation. We cannon, on our own account, launch into a policy of conquest which would eventually exclude us from the benefits of neutrality. The latter will facilitate the resumption of relations with our neighbours. M. Helleputte does not believe that we should resume relations with Germany. He is of the opinion that this Power would only seek some occasion for taking revenge on us. The annexation of Luxemburg meets with general sympathy. I recommend prudence in the utterance of these ambitions. The result of the war remains indecisive, and our recent offensives have hardly been crowned with success. It is possible that peace may be signed on the present-day line and that the reduction or the splitting up of Germany may turn out to be false dreams. The optimistic ideas of my ministers are so deep-rooted that what I say does not shake them very much. I point out, however, that it would be dangerous to let the country think that all the damage they have suffered will be reimbursed by the Government. The meeting then adjourns for closer examination of the attitude to be adopted by the government on the subject of Belgian claims.This question was resumed at a meeting held on the 17th April, which the King sums up as follows:17th April
Cabinet meeting.
M. de Broqueville began by reading a plan of instructions to be given to our diplomats. On the question of indemnities, everyone was in agreement. I remarked how important it was for Belgium to take part in the Peace Conference. We had to claim our place; the diplomats must insist on this point. Everyone was in agreement- M. Davignon proposed to ask that the Conference should be held in Brussels. Agreed unanimously. The question of neutrality, which is so essential, cannot, in my opinion, be the object of a categorical declaration, which would risk closing the doors of the Peace Conference to us. The expediency of neutrality with or without guarantee is to be studied at the wish of the Cabinet. The territorial aggrandisements which everyone hopes for, particularly the annexation of the Grand Duchy, will not be the object of declarations on the part of our diplomats; this question must be left open, particularly in view of the indecisive character of the war. This indecisive character compels us to envisage the compensations which eventually we shall have to demand of our Allies, who have made us such fine promises regarding our restoration. There are the commercial treaties, the loan facilities, the restitution of rolling stock, the transfer of shipping prizes to allow us to traffic on an ocean which will be shut to the Germans. I drew the attention of the Cabinet to MM. Segers; excellent plan. This is the moment, now or never, to create a navy. There will be gaps in the sea lanes on account of the exclusion of the Germans from certain ports. We must be able to fill these gaps, and it is to be supposed that England would favour our efforts to take the Germans' place. I pointed out to the ministers that in the present situation of the war, prudent expectations was the wisest course and that we should make ourselves ridiculous by planting flags on territories which nothing suggested that we should ever conquer. Nor must we ally ourselves to the Great Powers, seduced by the ambitious dreams which certain people dangle before our eyes to inveigle us into the orbit of military alliances. We must bring into the limelight the services we have rendered, the important role of our Army, always in logical concert with those of our greater neighbours. The Allies have done little for us. Even if the Germans have violated their treaties, the Allies have not known how to implement theirs. There is, particularly in France, a tendency to play down what we have done... The ministers appeared to be weaned from their over-optimism, fostered by the cafe gossip of the intriguing and hot-headed publicists who swarm in La Havre. It was decided to redraft once more the note to be given to the diplomats and to meet again in May when we can sit down to discuss the new findings.The capture of Drie Grachten by the Germans was the prelude to their great attack of April 22nd, tragically famous for the first tactical use of poison gas. Favoured by the surprise effect, the enemy assault, launched from both sides of Langemarck, in a few hours penetrated the Ypres salient. Our right wing, which had come to a halt as though by miracle at the limit of the chlorine waves, held its position coolly. For eight days our regiments of the 6th and 1st Divisions formed a rigid pivot on the flank of the pocket created by the enemy. This battle cost us 1,500 men. However, on the 26th M. Poincare visited the Belgian G.H.Q. and suggested that the loss of Drie Grachten by the Belgians was a setback all the more to be regretted, "because the Germans will turn it into a success which will impress the neutrals". Subsequent to this remark, His Majesty noted in his diary:I do not think that this incident is of a nature to impress the neutrals; they know that our positions have held for six months.But this reproach, repeated widely by the Chief of the French Mission, wounded the self-respect of our General Staff and the head of the Government. Warned that General Foch was preparing a large Franco-British attack in the region of Arras, the General Staff considered it indispensable for us to carry out an attack on the heights of Clercken, south of Dixmude. As for M. de Broqueville, he was of the opinion that certain of our new divisional commanders were lacking in enterprise.29th April
The Minister for War has spoken to me at Houthem about the promotion of officers. he questions the efficiency of Generals Drubbel and Jacques, both of whom are men of undisputed courage. He reproaches them for not being tacticians, a term which he does not seem able to define. He continues to judge from behind the lines the men who fight at the front. Given a little scope, he would like to reinstitute the peacetime examinations, as though war did not bring out the qualities in an officer.In actual fact, General Drubbel, whose division would bear the brunt of any attack south of Dixmude, considered that a crossing in force of the Yser, even if successful, would be costly and would place our troops in a salient and in an untenable position. Fortunately, General Foch, when consulted, was of the same opinion. On the other hand, the Allied counter-attacks between Langemarck and Steenstraet made little progress. The King noted:1st May
The positions lost in front of Ypres have only partially been recaptured by the English and the French despite some very violent attacks. One grows more and more convinced that the Allies will not force the German line, which is formidably organised; a break-through would demand a numerical superiority which the assailants do not possess. According to the Swiss newspapers, the Russian Front is becoming static. It is possible, therefore, that the war will end without a decision and that the forces engaged are equally balanced. The decision, or superiority, will fall to the one who can hold out the longest.From that moment it was decided that our participation in the form of a diversion would comprise two operations of a nature both effective and spectacular: the 2nd Division was to enlarge the bridgehead south of Dixmude and the 5th Division create a bridgehead in a favourable arc to the north of that town, flanked by a raid on the "oil tanks"- both operations to be accompanied as usual by an artillery barrage. The attack was launched on the 9th May simultaneously with the Allies' Artois offensive. it was successful at both bridgeheads. Our battalions dug in on the ground captured and held it in spite of heavy bombardments. We paid for this result with the loss of 600 men, but our troops gained self-confidence. On the 11th General Joffre came to express his satisfaction. He was, however, far from pleased with the trend of the main battle.12th May
Yesterday, saw General Joffre. Fairly satisfied. It is the terrible strongpoints which are stopping the Arras offensive. An attempt is to be made to bypass and invest them... The Bavarians, he says, are even more tenacious than the Prussians... According to him, the English offensive hardly functioned; there was no liaison with the French offensive.14th May
The French offensive is languishing. Will it finish as the preceding ones have done, with insignificant gains? This is to be feared. The proportion of forces engaged allows no chance of successful offensives against troops as tough as the Germans, who are past masters in organisation, in the occupation of localities, farms, and, indeed, anything that can serve as a strongpoint.This appreciation, although uttered far from the battle area, corresponds exactly to events. In a first magnificent spurt, the French attack broke the enemy lines at several points, chiefly on the front of the 33rd Corps, most ably commanded by General Petain. However, the Bavarian troops clung fiercely to the large villages of Carency, Souchez, Givenchy, Neuville, Ablain, St. Nazaire, defended in depth. The attack, successful between these jetties of resistance, found itself strangled in the insufficiently wide breaches. A struggle had to be waged yard by yard to expel the defenders from their system of deep dug-outs and communication trenches. This allowed the German Command time to bring up its reserves. Attacks and counter-attacks followed for several weeks, at the cost of bloody losses, without altering the contour of the front line. In the meanwhile, in the eastern theatre of war the Austrians and Germans, thanks to their heavy artillery, broke through the Russian Front in Galicia, advanced more than sixty miles, took 100,000 prisoners and relieved Hungary, which was expecting an invasion over the Carpathians. Without allowing herself to be influenced by these far from encouraging events, Italy, which since the outbreak of war had shown great sympathy for the Belgian attitude, decided to join the Allied camp. The King recorded this with a gleam of hope:21st May
The Italian Parliament has decided to enter the war, the deputies in favour numbering 407 against 74, while the senators were unanimous. This is the most important and the happiest event since the Battle of the Marne.The intervention of Italy bringing to the Entente an appreciable increase in forces, the King now took to studying the most logical and effective strategy to be undertaken by the Allied armies in order to relieve the Western Front and to win a large-scale victory. He arrived at a solution which he regarded as all the more valuable, as it would liberate Belgium while sparing her useless devastation. His Majesty took advantage of a visit to General Foch to win him over to his ideas.25th May
Visit to General Foch at Brias.
Left La Panne at 12.45. Arrived at Brias at 15.05 hours (nearly sixty miles) via Houthem, Hondschoote, Steenvoorde, Hazebrouck, Saint-Venant, Lillers. Beautiful countryside, radiant with the brilliant greenery of May. Farming continues everywhere, and one would not believe there was a war on if one did not meet motor convoys of wounded, munitions and supplies or see concentrations of troops everywhere. General Foch is comfortably installed with his General Staff in a magnificent chateau surrounded by a fine park. I expressed my fears for the future. "Now that the Italian armies have joined the Allies," I told him, "the balance of strength has broken in our favour; we should be able to push the Germans back. But in order to achieve this goal, and to achieve it quickly, there must be co-ordination in the action of the Allied forces. Unfortunately, this co-ordination does not exist. The English, who have well-hardened troops for the defence, should extend their front, thus freeing the French troops which are so suited to an offensive. They do not wish to extend their front, however, partly out of prudence, and also in order to preserve their troops for launching offensives of their own. "On the other hand, the direction of the attack now in progress exposes Belgium to all the horrors of war. The centre of the country risks being completely ravaged. This line of progress, furthermore, does not threaten the communications of the German Army. Even if we succeed in capturing Tournai, the enemy could hold the Yser front. On the supposition that we succeeded in advancing further, the Allies would break their heads against the formidable Antwerp-Brussels-Namur-Meuse line. "On the other hand, an operation undertaken from Verdun along the right bank of the Meuse in the direction of Montmedy, Virton, Bastogne, would quickly constitute a real peril for the German Army. This region, which I know well, would not provide the obstacles to such a manoeuvre that one might imagine. It is a country with broad, undulating hills, very sparsely inhabited and thinly wooded. A relatively shallow advance would, at one blow, force the enemy to evacuate not only Belgium but the whole of the invaded area of France." "I have tried my best," replied the General, "to persuade the English to take a larger front so as to free more French troops. But the British leaders, prudent to excess, have put up a thousand arguments against it." "Can't you prevail upon Lord Kitchener?" I insisted. "And on the British politicians? Speak to them in the language of common sense, show them that isolated offensives sacrifice thousands of men for insignificant results; tell them that by accepting a broad, defensive front they would be exploiting their soldiers' characteristic tenacity and that they would hasten the end of the war by liberating the greatest possible number of French divisions, which could immediately undertake a large-scale offensive" "I have spoken on several occasions," the General answered, "to certain people of the desirability of better co-operation between the French and the British Armies. I have little confidence in the usefulness of these steps since the British government is weak and divided and its Opposition incredibly incompetent. Our Allies lack leadership and unity. Lord Kitchener and Marshal French do not get on well together. However, we must keep French; he is the only man who understands the present war. In England, they have no conception of it." General Foch then did his best to dismiss my objections regarding the prospects of the Artois offensive, assuring me that things would go well, that the Germans were using up their resources, that we were advancing slowly and that we must be patient. Showing me a map with the contours of the front marked in different colours- "You see," he said, "how favourable the Arras sector towards Mons is- devoid of hills and descending in a gentle slope. In the Argonne and the Woevre the country is too difficult and the German defence system really very strong. And then if we continue beyond Mons, we come to the plain of Waterloo, the traditional focal point for international decisions..." "You must admit, however, that if the French reached lower Luxemburg the Germans would grow very anxious about their line of retreat." "I do not think so, because they would protect it by relying on the obstacles presented by the valleys of the Ourthe and its tributaries. I agree that Belgium will suffer the horrors of war, but I see no means of avoiding them. In any case, there will be no siege of Brussels; we shall attack the Antwerp-Namur position between the latter town and Brussels. The French Army hopes to move forward in the direction of Mons-Waterloo, the English Army towards Brussels; the Belgian Army will advance north of Brussels."The arguments put forward by General Foch disappointed the King. He bore away with him a disagreeable memory which was to remain with him. Often, after the war, he alluded to this interview and expressed his surprise that he had not been understood or listened to. On the 9th June General Foch announced that he was launching a new Franco-British offensive in the same Arras region. It would begin on the 16th. He hoped that the Belgian Army would take part in the shape of "a real attack". At the instigation of the Head of the French Mission, Comte de Broqueville supported this request for reasons of prestige; and our General Staff planned to cross the Yser in strength to the north of Dixmude should the Artois offensive succeed. Without wishing to discourage the General Staff, the King pointed out to them our weak holding in the line- two men per yard- and our complete lack of heavy artillery, whereas on the Allied attacking front eight to ten men were to be massed per yard and an impressive amount of material. Furthermore, the Germans were well on the alert north of Dixmude, where they did not cease to harry the bridgehead and "Death Alley". He did not believe in the success of General Foch's new operation, undertaken on a terrain which had been disturbed by a battle lasting a month. These forecasts proved true. The Franco-British attack on the 16th June against Vimy Ridge was a complete failure. On the other hand, in Galicia Mackensen's army resumed its advance and captured Lemberg. His Majesty noted:19th June
Now it will be a long time before we can start any new major offensive, and it will have to be launched in another place. A break-though on the Western Front grows more and more problematical, just as I have always predicted.22nd June
What with the halting of the Arras offensive and the continual retreat of the Russians, we can only look upon the future with apprehension. The Germans resist victoriously on one front and attack successfully on the other; they have, in fact, superiority of forces. It is only by a war of attrition that the Allies will reduce them, by encircling them and refusing to grant them peace terms for as long as possible.24th June
There is less and less chance of a break-through on this front by the Allied troops. On the other hand, the Germans cannot take new positions or advance in this sector. This impasse, in which both sides will be involved, will gradually result in peace feelers being put out.29th June
The French losses on the 16th, 17th and 18th June amount to 100,000 men; the result obtained- nil.The bloody reverse of the Battle of Artois suddenly seemed to have intimidated the British. During the month of July the British Military Misson warned us of a possible large-scale attack in six weeks' time and on several occasions inquired into the solidity of our defences. This anxiety spread even to our ministerial circles. In mid-August the Prime Minister made himself the spokesman of their alarm at the cabinet meeting. His Majesty retorted on behalf of our soldiers, that even if our lines had not the thorough organisation of the British defences, this was because our front was relatively spread out in proportion to our effectives; because the waterlogged terrain forced us to build all trenches in material transported from a distance; because of the take-over of sectors which had been little developed by the Allies; and above all because of the offensive actions in which we were always being asked to participate, thus absorbing most of our combatants in the front line. Furthermore, the General Staff had received the necessary recommendations and the King would see that they were carried out by numerous visits to the trenches. These were duly entered in the King's diary:2nd July
Visit to the 1st Division.
Accompanied by General Bernheim and Major Galet, we entered the trenches north-west of Noordschoote, which prolong the line beyond the Reninghe road. There we found a company under the orders of Major Perraux (2nd Regiment of the Line). From a machine-gun post we could see a few hundred yards away a small wood where the Germans were supposed to be entrenched. A sap placed in front of the lines was supposed to be occupied or to have been destroyed. We skirted the edge of Noordschoote, following the line of the trenches. Here were troops of the 2nd Regiment of the Line, which occupy the whole of the northern sector. The trenches were good. The locality could have been better defended; it should have formed a strongpoint in the line, which is not the case. We continued along the trenches, which first approach and then run parallel for over half a mile to the cobbled road leading south of Noordschoote. The trenches are good and comparatively clean; the men look fit. The central sector of the division stretches along the right bank of the Yser Canel to Ypres, as far as the Maison du Passeur. It is occupied by the 4th Regiment of the Line. We arrived here at a more battered zone; the shell-holes grew more numerous, and parts of the trench had been damaged that morning by shells. The number of crosses indicates that the defence of this position has cost many lives. Near the Maison du Passeur, where the French fought for more than a month to drive out the Germans who had crossed the Canel, a third row of trenches runs along the Ypres Canel. To reach them we had to follow a narrow communication trench where you have to keep your head down, for if you show it for one moment you risk being hit by a sniper's bullet. This is the sector occupied for the moment by the Grenadiers. They are hardly a hundred years away from the Germans and there is a constant exchange of fire. The Grenadiers make an excellent impression. It is a crack regiment. I met Major Borremans, in command of the front-line battalion. We reached Pypegaele by a good communication trench, which follows the crest. We visited the pickets. About 4.30 we returned to Oostvleteren after meeting Colonel Burguet on the way.6th July
I have seen General Michel and General Jacquet. I advised them to strengthen their lines and to bring up material for the protection of their men.31st July
Visit to the 5th Division sector.
I left La Panne by car about 4.30 in the morning. The weather was farm and fine. We went first to Forthem Bridge, where we had an appointment with General Rucquoi. We made our way with him towards Lampernisse and Oostkerke, where we left the car and followed the Dixmude railway track on foot. After half a mile we visited to our right the "Franco-Belgian" farm which serves as a strongpoint for the third-line defence and leads to St. Jacques-Capelle. The walls have good loopholes, and one can see that those responsible take an active interest in the defences of the sector. The country is resplendent with green. In the distance, through the mist on the horizon, lie outlined the houses and ruins of Dixmude, Caeskerke, the Troost Farm, the houses of Burg and Tanks. We could hear the gunfire; two aeroplanes were having a dog fight and using their machine-guns. We left the Furnes railway track for that of Nieuport, where the old trenches are, and further south arrived at the battalion headquarters of the northern sector. The O.C., Major Tassier, accompanied us on a visit to his sub-sector. We passed through the terribly devastated village of Caeskerke and, along a very good communication trench, at least reached the trenches of the Yser near Milestone 16. It was 6.15 a.m. Our main defence line is firmly established in the dyke which dominates the other bank. Sacks of earth have been accumulated, and the parapet is six feet high. There are firing bays, which are preferable to loopholes. We met first the 3rd Chasseurs, then the 2nd Chasseurs and finally the 1st Regiment of the Line. The officers and soldiers make a very good impression. I met Major Gateau, Major Plouvier, Captain Hognoul and Captains Leurs, Duflou and van Oberghen. With the 2nd Chasseurs, I met Lieutenant-Colonel Blijkaert, Major Panhuis, Majors Borlee and Desclee; with the 1st of the Line, Major van der Hove, Majors Spiegeleer, de Bel, Hennequin and Migeon. Through a loophole near one of the foot bridges crossing the Yser, we had a view of the bridgehead north of Dixmude, which cost so many lives and where we lost two first-class officers: Colonel Rademaekers and Captain Vilain. There are a few good dug-outs proof against 8-inch shells. The trenches are narrow, and there is no risk of being hit by a bullet. The trenches are clean and are a credit to the 5th Division. My visit to the front-line trenches in this sector, over a mile and a half long, took me exactly 1 hour 25 minutes. There are three sub-sectors, each of them divided into two headquarters for two companies. We left the line at Milestone 19 of the Yser, where the 2nd Division starts. Following a communication trench to begin with, we crossed the fields and reached Milestone 2, on the Dixmude-Alveringem road. It was a quiet day- an exchange of rifle shots and the drone of a few 210-cm. shells, which we heard pass overhead, destined for Caeskerke halt.The King accepted with enthusiasm an invitation to visit the French front.22-23-24 and 25th August
Journey to the French front.
General Biebuick, Major Galet, Major Preidhomme and I left La Panne on the 22nd at 8.15 p.m., on a magnificent evening. It was bright moonlight; light mist rose from the fields and turned the flat countryside white. At Dunkirk we boarded the special train sent by the French Government to meet us. Colonel Penelon, of the President's Maison Militaire, Major de Galbert of the General Staff and M. Pierront of the Compagnie du Nord received us. A few decorations were given and precisely at 9 o'clock in the evening the train left. Our speed was very slow; we were not due to arrive at Chantilly before 9 o'clock in the morning. We passed through Cassel, Walon-Chapelle, Saint-Omer, Caffiers, Boulogne, Etaples, and Abbeville. At Amiens day broke. It was glorious weather, and the countryside, with its valleys and woods, was a refreshing sight for our eyes, weary of the monotony of the beaches and sand dunes of the North Sea. We were received at Chantilly station by the President, M. Millerand, and General Joffre. Exchange of compliments and wards of decorations. Then we set out in a car for Rethondes, where a presentation of flags to regiments of the 35th Corps was to take place. We crossed the town of Chantilly and had a glimpse of the superb chateau in its beautiful park. Then came the rather arid plain as far as Senlis, where the forest of Compiegne begins. Compiegne has suffered little, although it has been bombarded from time to time by long-range guns. After leaving Compiegne we followed the valley of the Aisne, which passes through Rethondes. We found ourselves before an immense plain flanked on the north by the Forest of Laigle and bounded on the south by the river. We were received by General Ebener, commanding the 35th Corps. The troops were lined up in mass formation. They were the 174th, 408th and 409th Regiments of the Line (one battalion); the 2nd Combined Regiment of Zouaves and Infantry; a regiment of Moroccan infantry, and the 7th Chasseurs d'Afrique. After passing along the line of troops, the President presented five flags and made a very beautiful speech in his clear voice. The march-past then took place. It was very fine and impressive at the lithe, rapid pace characteristic of French infantry. Although newly formed, the troops had been well drilled and were well equipped. Returning to the car, we went through the village of Rethondes, where the population gave a very patriotic demonstration. We skirted the southern edge of the Forest of Laigle; to our left was the Aisne surrounded by rich fields. We crossed the Oise at Choisy-au-Bac and made our way up the valley of the Aronde as far as the ample wooded hills. After a few miles, the road leads to Marqueglise, where one rejoins the valley of the Mats. At Bessons-sur-Matz, headquarters of the 13th Corps, we left the valley to visit the magnificent observation post of Boulogne-la-Grasse, a wooded hill, nearly 400 feet high, dominated by a castle, whose tower we climbed. There we found an observer officer, who showed us the interesting localities scattered over the immense horizon of hills, plateaux and woods, which extend as far as the eye can see: Lassigny, Roye, Les Loges, Thiescourt Woods. By a few scars in the ground of different-coloured soil, we could guess rather than actually see the position of the German trenches. Profound silence everywhere. Not a gun shot, not a rifle shot. Here the war seemed to languish. Nor could we even see a single shell crater around this observation post just over two miles from the lines. It was 1 o'clock and time pressed. We went through Rollot and Montdidier to Davenescourt and its fine chateau, where we had lunch. An open landscape, a few tall trees, the valley of the Avre, a tributary of the Somme. Then we visited a plateau to the south of Villers-Bretonneux, where we were received by General Cure and where are based the troops of the 18th Division (9th Corps) under the command of General Lefevre. Magnificent troops: a most impressive march-past by the 32nd, 77th, 66th, 90th, 125th and 135th Regiments of the Line and the 7th Regiment of Hussars. The 9th Corps is one of those which has been most in action since the beginning of the war, particularly in Lorraine, Arois and at Ypres. About 6 o'clock we arrived by some pretty little ravines enclosed by the Forest of Thiescourt at the strongpoint of that name, situated to the east of Maroeil. Under the excellent cover of the forest, positions can be organised comfortably without being spotted. We pushed forward as far as the forward lines. The pickets were entrenched in a quarry, where they were completely sheltered from bombardment. Officers and soldiers looked spick and span. Still the same claim; no shell-holes. One wondered if we really were at war. The villages near the front have hardly any houses damaged. What a difference from our front! We returned to Chantilly at 8.30 p.m., after a day which was frankly tiring, but in the course of which we had seen a great many interesting things. General Joffre invited us to dinner in his spacious villa. That evening at 10 o'clock we boarded the special train which was to take us to Lorraine. About 6 o'clock next morning, in magnificent weather, I woke up as the train was crossing the rocky plateau of Lorraine. We left the main Nancy line and made a detour through Gondrecourt, to avoid Commercy and Lerouville, which are sometimes shelled. We rejoined the Nancy line at Sarcy; and passed through Pagny-sur-Meuse and Toul. Then we followed the Pont-St. Vincent line, where we arrived at 8 o'clock. We set out immediately for the Azelot plateau, where a great review of the 20th Corps was to take place. On a beautiful morning, we rode past these magnificent troops, presented by Generals Balfourier, Ferry, Deligny and Varin. Then they marched past. There were massed bands and an impressive group who passed at a fast double. A grandiose sight, thanks to the martial pace of these crack regiments, quite near the battlefront, beneath a dazzling sky. These solid squares really represented the strength and hope of France, a living picture of the vigour and valour of this admirable race. After the review and the presentation of decorations, we got back into the car and went through Luneville on the way to Einville, where a cavalry division is stationed. Colonel Gatinne welcomed us and took us round the camp. We returned by Crevic, General Liautey's village, which has been almost entirely destroyed and came back via Dombasle and St. Nicholas-du-Port to lunch at the Chateau de Fleville, the beautiful old place of the de Lamballe family. After lunch we went to the aerodrome of Matzeville, by-passing the town of Nancy. It dominates the latter, as well as the valley of the Meurthe. Here a magnificent display had been arranged for us: a simultaneous take-off of sixty planes. The whole sky was full of them. It was an intense and general buzzing which reminded me of a swarm of bees. Major Roisin showed us the ground installations and the machines themselves, with their bombs and rockets. He is a bold pilot and a fine leader. We then went to Mont. St. Jean, the Grand Couronne of Nancy from which one enjoys a magnificent view over the valley of the Seille and its woods, the hills of Delme and Chateau-Salins, Noumeny, and even the steeples of Metz. The summit, covered with a pine forest, forms an excellent cover for artillery batteries. There is a 160-cm. navel gun here which can fire eleven miles. We came down by way of Custines, where we visited the camp and then took our places in the train, which left at 6.15. The thing that struck me during this rapid journey was the good order of everything; the fine behaviour of the troops and their discipline, their manner of saluting and their excellent morale.While the English geared an attack in Flanders, the French Command considered it only right to take advantage of the weakening of the enemy in the West resulting from his transfer of troops to the Russian front. It thus determined to launch in September a large-scale offensive into which fifty divisions were to be thrown. General Foch and General Joffre told the King of this intention in successive visits.11th September
General Joffre has just told me of the new big offensive which the French and the English are going to attempt, involving more than a million. They have plenty of ammunition and new big guns. The General is very hopeful. The main attack will take place in Champagne, with a subsidiary attack at Arras, next to that of the English. "Whether it succeeds or not," said Joffre, "we can do no more. The Italians will make a great effort towards the end of September; the Russians lack guns, but they have plenty of man power." General Foch, who had come before the Generalissimo to announce the visit and tell me the latter's plans, was not very optimistic. One has the impression that decisive days are at hand and that there is less confidence than at the time of the earlier offensive. Is this perhaps a good omen? I asked General Joffre what reinforcements he proposed to give our army in case it were attacked. He considers that the terrain before Ypres is stoutly defended, held by good and numerous troops commanded by an excellent general. In the case of a mass attack from this side, which he considers highly improbable, the reserve of the French troops at Nieuport, three divisions strong, as well as three British reserve divisions, will be swiftly thrown in.Shortly after this, on receiving from General Hely d'Oissel, in command of the French forces at Nieuport, a note which envisaged, in the event of a German offensive on Ypres, a falling back if necessary to the advanced posts of Dunkirk, the King expressed his anxiety at a concept which was so contrary to his firmest intentions. He sent for the General to intimate to him his decision never to abandon the Yser position and to explain the way in which he understood its defence.
Part 2