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King Albert's War Diary 4/5 • Tribute
a year ago
28th December
M. Berthelot was announced at 3.30. He had come from London, where he was present at the meetings of the War Cabinet with MM. Ribot and Albert Thomas; M. Briand, who was ill, was unable to make the journey. He brought me a letter from Lord Curzon and immediately broached the subject of separate notes and of the danger which the submission of separate replies to Germany and to the United States represented. "It will be looked upon," he said, "as a change of attitude on the part of Belgium, which the enemy will utilise in an attempt to reach a separate peace." "Have you been charged by the British government to tell me all this?" I asked. "Mr. Lloyd George, who was very disturbed, requested me to point out to you all the perils of the attitude the Belgian Government wished to adopt. The English Ministers were very preoccupied with this question." "Separate notes do not imply a separate peace, a thing which no member of the Belgian Government has in mind. The latter had given careful thought to the matter and had unanimously reached the solution of separate notes. I shall support this procedure, which, in my opinion, best conforms to the interests of my country. We have duties and responsibilities to Belgium." M. Berthelot insisted on the anxiety this act, which might seem to be a change of attitude on the part of Belgium, would cause the Allies. "Belgium," I replied, "has no intention of altering her present relationship with the Allies, but a clarification of the situation is necessary as regards the neutral nations and, in particular, as regards the United States, with whom we occupy a special position. In replying to the latter, we are addressing a protector and not, as in your case, a mediator." The conversation lasted a long time without either of us yielding a point. Among M. Berthelot's assurances, I must mention his conviction of total victory. "Our ideal must triumph," he said. "It is a war of principles. Were France to be offered Alsace-Lorraine and even more, no Frenchman, in my view, would dream of laying down arms. What is your opinion?" "For every country, it is a question of self-preservation, whose really patriotic statesman should be its highest expression." M. Berthelot denies that the war is, above all, a conflict between England and Germany. According to him, Great Britain is not aiming in any way at a hegemony; she took up arms to defend the principle of nationalities.In the letter M. Berthelot brought, Lord Curzon observed: Certain telegrams had been brought to his notice, indicating that the Belgian Government wished to send replies distinct from the joint note of the Allies, both to the German and to the American notes. The opinion was strongly and unanimously voiced that a procedure of this nature would be inopportune and could have a serious influence upon the future progress of the war. It was quite true that Belgium was, to a certain extent, in a different position from the other Allies and that she took up arms solely to defend her violated territory; it was quite true that she claimed no more than the recovery of what had been taken, reparations for unjust cruelties and guarantees for the future. It was possible that Germany might be disposed to agree to this and that she would joyfully pay this price in the prospect of detaching Belgium from the Allies and making a separate peace with her. He did not imagine for a moment that King Albert or his Government envisaged a result of this nature, but he was very much afraid that if the King embarked upon separate notes it would result in separate peace negotiations which could be followed by separate conditions...
To which the King replied immediately:I am most grateful for the frankness with which you have explained your point of view and for the opportunity you have given me to develop my own. I intend, therefore, to explain my current viewpoint with the frankness which I consider to be called for by the great events we are living through and by the grave responsibilities which weigh on us. You fear that the instruments drafted by the Belgian government might imperceptibly lead her to a separate peace with Germany. I do not share your fears on this subject. According to the conditions stated, Belgium declares that she will not lay down arms until she has recovered her independence and her integrity, obtained legitimate reparations, guarantees and security for her future. Germany cannot leave Belgium until she had made peace with the Great Western Powers and, in particular, with England, for Belgium constitutes Germany's security as regards Great Britain. She cannot and will not evacuate the country before making peace with the latter. England holds the seas and the German colonies; Belgium is the counterpart in German hands. I have never envisaged the idea of a separate peace. The fate of Belgium during this war is irrevocably bound to that of England, but where our ideas differ is on the issue of the conflict, and it is this which leads us to explain our point of view to President Wilson. You want to pursue your conduct of the war to the end, to the final exhaustion of the enemy, and you think that you can achieve this result. I do not share your view. I think that there will be neither victors nor vanquished, that the present results will not be perceptibly modified. Everything leads me to believe that the Western Front is now static on its present lines; and that Germany will transfer to this front, which is so essential for her, all the forces she can spare from the Eastern Front which we see growing weaker every day. In the struggle which the Great Powers want to wage to the bitter end, I can see for the Belgian people-Almost entirely in the hands of the enemy-only an increase of suffering as a result of the ruthless character the war may now assume and of which the invaded countries will bear the brunt. Those who are responsible for safeguarding the interests of the Belgian nation cannot, with their eyes open, subscribe to a war policy which exposes Belgium to total destruction. Probably the moment for negotiations has not yet arrived. It is not when the enemy has just won great victories that one should bargain with him. When the moral effect of his conquests has worn off, however, it would be intelligent than to lay down the aims to be achieved.While the King loyally and strongly defended the position of Belgium, the Government continued to strike its flag daily under special pressure from the Allied diplomats. It allowed our texts to be changed to an arrogant intransigence; it agreed to efface from our reply to Washington the announce of our war aims and to transform this reply into a commonplace propaganda lecture. Profoundly disappointed by these successive weaknesses, His Majesty expressed his displeasure to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:As you very rightly state, the Allies, after asking us to suppress in our note everything concerning peace conditions, have decided to list the most far-reaching war aims in their own text. In actual fact you have been circumvented by M. Cambon, who, not content with Belgium's total adherence to the Allied war aims, obtained the deletion of our own and even the despatch of an obedient letter, whose terms, had they not been modified, would have been the equivalent of a posthumous signature to the London Pact... What I should have liked to obtain in the interests of Belgium was the definition of our national viewpoint in an official text. This was necessary with regard to the neutrals at a moment when the latter are preparing to bring pressure on the belligerents to end the conflict. This goal, which the Cabinet had assigned to its policy, has not been reached. We must recognise the fact. I think that with more firmness we should have been able to obtain a definition of our particular situation for the purposes of America. From the moment our campaign ended with merely securing a rather more wordy adhesion on our part to the Allies' war aims, it would have been better to renounce the separate note and to send, as you suggested in one of your letters, a special official address to President Wilson. You speak of the Allies' suspicions; we must not exaggerate them. They need our flag, our example and our sufferings. Let us not be so naive as to fall for this bogey, which consists in trying to intimidate us by the threat of suspicions these leaders would be incapable of making the public in their own countries share.THE CAMPAIGN OF 1917
The state of the Belgian Army-The Peace Campaign fails; the favourable moment has passed-England takes over the direction of the war-The ideas of General Nivelle-His plan-The Russian Revolution-Total submarine warfare-The strategic German withdrawal-The Nivelle Plan re-formed and already compromised-The April Allied offensive-General Petain Commander-in-Chief of the French armies-The plan for the reconquest of the Belgian coast-Refusal on the part of the King to come under the British Command-The King does not believe in the success of the plan-The conditions for Belgian participation-The vast, open preparations for the offensive-The German reaction-Mediocre results of the 31st July attack-The new English plan-Refusal to join it by the French and Belgians-The fruitless battle of mid-August-The poor success of the October battle-No prospect of debouching by Dixmude-The wearing down of the British forces-The Russian disintegration-The Italian crisis of Caporetto-General Petain's opinion-The King's conclusions-The reconstitution of the Government.
Although the 1916 campaign involved the Belgian Army in no important operation, the Yser sector was never quiet for a single day. The Dixmude and Steenstraet regions, in particular, became the normal scene of frenzied mortar duels. In all, the fighting cost us 16,000 men. The arrival of volunteers who had escaped from Belgium by crossing the Belgo-Dutch frontier which the Germans had closed, balanced these losses and, together with militiamen raised in the non-occupied zone, allowed our effectives to rise to 130,000 men. Great advances were realised or were in the process of realisation in the matter of armament and equipment. The infantry was to be issued with Lewis guns. The introduction of the Van Deuren mortar put us in a position to reply blow for blow to the terrible short-range Minenwerfer. our factories at Le Havre and Birmingham, created and developed on the initiative of Colonel Blaise, kept our material in repair and supplied us with ammunition. Through the services of Baron Empain we were able to acquire small arms and batteries of medium-calibre guns, which gradually gave some shape to our heavy artillery. The Belgian divisions went by rota to Mailly Camp, where they learnt the elementary tactics practised by the French Army. A complete network of hospitals and dressing stations under the aegis of Her Majesty the Queen with a selected medical staff and the best possible medical supplies, assured rapid and effective attention for our sick and wounded in comfortable surroundings. The month of December saw changes in the Allied Governments, its last days being marked by alterations in the French High Command. General Joffre handed over his task to General Nivelle. General Foch was replaced in his command of the northern armies by General Franchet d'Esperey. These changes heralded the adoption of new methods. General Nivelle had just distinguished himself by closing the battle of Verdun with a remarkably well-organised counter-attack, which pushed the Germans back to their initial positions with the loss of 11,000 prisoners and more than 100 guns. Full of confidence in his method of attack-swift, continuous and in-depth-he intended to apply it to large-scale offensive. Hardly had he taken up his command than the new Generalissimo, in company with the President of the Republic, came to visit the King, who wrote after the interview:4th January
The new Commander-in-Chief, General Nivelle, gives one an excellent impression. He is calm, energetic and thoughtful. He condemns battles which last several months. "We must gain our objectives in the first two days," he said, "profit by the surprise effect and exploit the break in the enemy line on the principles of open warfare." The next offensive will be speeded up. We hope to start it in February. I expressed my fears on the subject of an offensive movement to be carried out across our country, which would bring it to destruction. The General replied that with his plan nothing of the kind was to be feared. He seems to have a very fair conception of the role of our army, of the suffering it has endured and its lack of reserves. He understands the difficulty of imposing upon it a real offensive in the terrain of the Yser; he realises that the objectives it would reach would be of no strategical value.This good impression was confirmed on the receipt of a note dated the 12th, in which the General declared: "As far as the participation of the Belgian Army in the Franco-British offensive of 1917 is concerned, I consider that it should not take place before the last phase of the general battle. "The co-operation of the Belgian Army will be indispensable when it becomes a question of exploiting successes subsequent to the break-though, and of chasing the enemy from Belgian soil. There is no question of launching the Belgian Army in offensive operations against an intact enemy or one still in possession of most of his defences." The Generalissimo's projects, however, seemed a trifle ambitious. Announceing as his objective "the destruction of the main enemy forces on the Western Front", he was staging a double offensive-Anglo-French between Arras and Roye, French between Rheims and Soissons-aiming to strangle the Noyon salient. He wanted to attack as quickly as possible for fear of seeing himself forestalled by the enemy, as had been the case the year before. But his forces had little superiority. He also had to overcome the resistance of the British, who wanted to attack in Flanders and who would not join his plan except on the decision of the War Office. Thus he was forced to postpone the start of the offensive until March. On the 31st January the Central Powers declared total submarine warfare in the blockade zone of the British, French and Italian coasts. This was an insult to the rights of America, and on the 4th February the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany It was, anyway, clear that the new German Command-Hindenburg-Ludendorff-was doing its best to counter the Allied land offensives.4th February
Diplomatic relations broken between the U.S.A. and Germany. Total submarine warfare must have been foreseen in all its aspects in Berlin. It must have serious chances of influencing the outcome of the war; otherwise, Germany would have recoiled before its possible consequences. Does she hope to strike England at her most vulnerable point? Only the future can give us the answer. This will obviously be one of the last phases of this immense conflict. We learn that the German Army is being reinforced in material, particularly on our front. It is announced in other quarters that twenty new divisions are being formed in Germany; this will bring the number of German divisions on the Western Front to 155. The Allies dispose of 170 divisions. This slight superiority does not allow us to bank on decisive results for the great offensive planned for March.On receipt of a note from the Generalissimo asking for our heavy artillery to be put at his disposal to reinforce the preparatory bombardment for the French attacks, the King accepted eagerly.9th February
General Nivelle has sent us a note asking for the collaboration of our heavy artillery. We agree to this request, happy to have an opportunity of showing goodwill.A second note arrived two days later saying that if the effects of the great combined offensive did not come up to expectations an amphibious Anglo-Franco-Belgian operation would be staged, under British command, aimed at reconquering the Belgian coast. In his capacity as Sovereign as well as Commander-in-Chief, the King viewed the revival of this prospect with undisguised apprehension. The following comment proves it:11th February
The Chief of the French Mission has sent us a new note. It comprises two parts: the first outlines the action of the Belgian Army subsequent to the success of the great Franco-British offensive of the Somme and the Oise; the second, valid only in the case where the main offensive does not give the hoped-for results, deals with a minor operation to be carried out on the Flemish coast with twenty English, three or four French divisions and the Belgian Army with the co-operation of the French and British fleets. For this last operation, the combined forces will be entrusted to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. The note quotes in this connexion the example of the Salonika Army. This point has made a bad impression on us. It is a humiliation for the Belgian Army Command. It also exposes us to very great sacrifices. The recapture of the coast serves the interests of England rather than those of Belgium. It is astonishing that we have been notified of such a plan, which could only cause us a disagreeable surprise. One sees quite well that small countries must beware of the big ones, even when the latter call themselves Allies! Meanwhile, the trend of the submarine war was followed with great care.13th February
All eyes are on the submarine conflict. The British Navy inspires very great confidence. We have faith in its strategy and in the courage of its crews. Nevertheless, the problem of British supplies entails fearful unknown problems. Has everything been foreseen? May they not run short of tonnage? The Government has allocated for war purposes 50 per cent according to Lloyd George, 60 per cent according to Runciman. There remains a very small margin for the food-supply and general commercial requirements. Submarine warfare could eat into this margin dangerously. Even if it does not lead to a decisive result, this action will go far to create a state of embarrassment which may well influence the development of the war.4th March
Visit from Admiral Jellicoe.
A real sailor and a real Anglo-Saxon. He takes a serious view of the situation as a result of the submarine war. In February 500,000 tons were sunk, and against this between eight and ten enemy submarines were destroyed. It is extremely difficult to know when a submarine has been sunk. The training of hunter crews is not difficult, above all when only mine-laying is involved. The Germans are beginning to lack experienced officers.While on the Somme and the Aisne fronts the British and French were feverishly equipping their sectors for attack, the curtain went up on two events of the utmost gravity which reduced the already poor chances of the future offensive and foreboded far-reaching modifications on the world stage. On the 12th and 13th March riots broke out in Petrograd; the revolutionary hordes, composed for the most part of workers and soldiers, swamped the town, overpowered the police, opened the prisons and set fire to Government buildings. The ministers of the Tsar were forced to resign. Besides a Duma, which was to study constitutional reforms, a Council of Workers and Soldiers was set up, whose admitted goal was to proclaim the "Socialist Republic" and to put a stop to the war. On the Western Front the Germans carried out a vast strategical withdrawal and, after systematic demolitions, evacuated the whole region situated to the east of La Fere-St. Quentin-Croisilles. Evading the pincer movement prepared by General Nivelle, they based their defence lines on a shortened, rectified and very powerfully defended front known as the "Hindenburg Line". The King immediately sensed that the Allied plans could be completely upset.[/quote]15th March
Russia presents symptoms of a very grave internal situation. We learn that a revolt has broken out in Petrograd caused by the food crisis. Despite a ukase of dissolution, the Duma remains in session, as did the States General in 1789. Several regiments appear to have thrown in their lot with the rebels, who have taken the arsenal, burnt the Law Courts and opened the prisons. The Duma has formed a provisional government; it has imprisoned the ministers, except the Minister for Foreign Affairs. A message has been sent to the Tsar.16th March
We have suddenly heard that the Tsar has abdicated; that the Grand Duke Nicholas has been offered the Regency; that the rebels hold Petrograd and Moscow and that the entire Army has joined the uprising. The truth will gradually come to light. The Tsar seems to have been forced to abdicate. The Grand Duke Nicholas does not seem anxious to accept the crushing burden offered him. What role have the English and the French played in this tragedy? Their ambassadors have been very hasty in recognising the new Government. When a traditional power is overthrown, a course has been entered upon which it is difficult to arrest. The people, their appetites whetted, are no longer content with moderate measures. Whether they wish it or not, they too have to go on "to the end".18th March
We are surprised to see that the English and French newspapers-Action Française being the honourable exception-consider the Russian Revolution to be a triumph for the Allies; that the "Russian nation" will accomplish the miracles which the Empire was incapable of realising. However, we read that, despite the war, the provisional Government is determined to bring about all the social and political reforms; and first of all to organise general and local elections, an idea which the British and French Governments refuse to entertain, even though they are not in the throes of a revolution!21st March
The great event is the German withdrawal to the new front line, Arras-St. Quentin-Laon. The Allies see in this the consummation of the Battle of the Somme. I myself prefer to regard it as a very bold large-scale manoeuvre, intended to draw the French forces far from Paris in order later, south of Verdun, to attempt a powerful offensive movement westwards to turn their flank or encircle the French troops in actions further to the north. The Chief of the French Mission tells me that General Nivelle is determined to press on with his offensive in the region originally fixed, Rheims- Soissons, while the British will operate to the north of Arras. It is very dangerous to move in the north and expose their flank and rear to an enemy offensive!22nd March
The Russian Revolution exceeds all expectations. They do not want Grand Duke Nicholas as their leader. No more Romanoffs! Russia, in the grip of extremists, will march towards a republic, and discipline in the Army will be compromised. The unity and strength of the latter will be proportionately diminished. That is the result of this movement, which, with their short-sighted views, most of the Allies greeted with such candid joy. In spite of everything, the Generalissimo's optimism remained unshakable.23rd March
Visit from General Nivelle.
The General maintains that the German withdrawal is more than he could have hoped for. "It does not alter one whit," he added, "the Anglo-French offensive, whose front will merely have to be modified. It will be started on the 8th April, in the neighbourhood of Rheims by the French and of Arras by the British." General Nivelle is full of confidence, nevertheless, he admits that the Germans are stronger than last year. Many people, he confesses, are against the offensive we are going to undertake. On the question of the Russian events, he complains that we are so ill-informed; a fortnight before the Revolution General de Castelnau had written that the Tsar's authority had never been stronger.1st April
The Extremists seem to hold the Moderates in their power. That is the way with revolutions. So far it is very difficult to estimate the morale of the Army, and what tendencies will manifest themselves as a result of the latest events, under the initiative of leaders who have brought about the fall of Tsarism.2nd April
We read in the declaration by the Russian Committee that the Russian nation will not make peace except with the German Republic. This idea will be clung to by the innumerable socialists sent by the Allies to Russia to stimulate the warlike ardour of the Muscovites. But in the meanwhile, a great Russian offensive has become an improbability; nor will the Italians achieve anything. Therefore Hindenburg will be able to bring back enough divisions to the Western Front to try and reach a decision.7th April
An event of great importance: the declaration of war by the United States on Germany. America will immediately furnish 500,000 men, followed by a second 500,000. Germany's need to seek a final decision on the Western Front is growing more urgent. The Germans have there at the moment 147 divisions, as opposed to 119 in 1916, the period of the great Allied attack on the Somme. I asked M. Painleve why an offensive was being planned, when America will soon be entering the conflict. He replied: "I agree with you, but I did not order this operation." The battle was opened on the 11th April by the British on the Arras front, and was continued from west to east by the French armies between the 11th and 18th April. The Allies, who incidentally were hampered by bad weather, came up everywhere against an enemy who had made sure of his rear organisation and had brought up his reserves; local successes were achieved, above all by the British; but a break-through occurred neither in Artois, nor north of the Aisne, nor in Champagne, and the French troops paid very heavily for their feeble gains in the Soissons sector.19th April
The great French offensive carried out by the Third Army on the 11th, by the Fifth and Sixth Armies on the 16th and the Fourth Army on the 17th, has produced only insignificant results in comparison with the goals aimed at and the assurances expressed by the High Command. The newspapers will naturally celebrate the capture of 14,000 men and twelve guns; they will proclaim that this is the beginning of an uninterrupted train of successes destined to carry us to the Rhine. The losses will not be mentioned. Why should they be mentioned?23rd April
A new offensive by the British. Without great result, if one considers the number of troops engaged and the losses suffered. It is the war of attrition all over again-what an absurd idea to pursue victory by wearing-down tactics which in actual fact wear down both adversaries at the same time! The true art of war, or a proper understanding of the principles of military leadership, would never admit of such a system.Faced with the setback to his break-through, which cost the French Army 85,000 dead and wounded, General Nivelle reverted, in fact, to wearing-down operations. On the 11th May his dismissal was announced by the War Committee. He was replaced on the 15th by General Pétain. No sooner had he taken over his new duties than the new C.-in-C. of the French armies forwarded to the King a statement, which read as follows: "The forthcoming operations in Flanders will be carried out for the most part by the British Army, which will assign about thirty divisions to it. Because of the front it occupies as well as by reason of the prospects thus opened for the reoccupation of Belgian territory, the Belgian Army has an inevitable interest in this. The French Army will also participate "In these conditions it is only natural that the conduct of these operations should be in the hands of the British Army. The minor part to be taken by the Belgians and the French requires that the troops of these two nations be united under a single command. The best way of solving this question seems to me to offer His Majesty the King of the Belgians the command for the duration of operations of the French divisions which will participate. Our troops, which have never been placed under a foreign command, will be proud in these exceptional circumstances to take orders from the King of the Belgians; they will certainly consider it to be an honour to serve under such a leader." Through his Chief of Staff His Majesty replied:
Although greatly flattered by the offer to command the French troops, whose great merit has been confirmed in so many battles, the King cannot accept a situation where, in fact, he would be abdicating his authority over the Belgian Army. The King holds the command of the Army from the constitution, that is to say, by the will of the Belgian people, whose first servant he considers himself. It is not for him to relinquish a part of this command, the responsibility for which has been entrusted to him by the nation. He is therefore obliged to decline the offer to command the Franco-Belgian Army and to retain the effective and exclusive command of the Belgian Army...
The visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army gave the King an opportunity of developing his protest as regards a plan to which he was asked to contribute although it was conceived without his knowledge.
25th May
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig visited me today at eleven o'clock at La Panne. He spoke to me of the entry into action of a Franco-Belgian army, the organisation and role of which General Pétain had told him was agreed with the Belgian Command. "I have had no exchange of views with General Pétain," I replied. "The latter sent me a note proposing the formation of a Franco-Belgian army made up chiefly of six French divisions, of which I was to assume the command. I declined this offer because it took away from me the exclusive authority I exercise over my own army, which I intend to retain in conformity with Belgian law." "It would make my task much easier," objected the Marshal, "had I to deal with a single Allied commander in the conduct of the enterprise entrusted to me." "The co-operation of the Belgian Army," I replied, "has been effected perfectly during the most difficult periods of the campaign, particularly during the battle of the Marne and the battle of Flanders. All of us are animated by a single desire: to contribute to the common success. Nevertheless, we ought not to be asked to do the impossible; for example, to undertake an offensive in a terrain as difficult as ours against an enemy who is always in possession of large reserves. "Our action," I added, "should have been concerted, in conformity with the pact of the 4th August 1914. But now we are faced with cut-and-dried decisions." "The Governments," he said, "have laid down the principle of an offensive destined to free the coast, but the details have not been completely fixed. The British will begin by occupying the Messines Ridge in order to straighten out the Ypres salient; they will then advance on Roulers by the Forest of Houthulst and Zonnebeke. A landing will possibly take place between Nieuport and Ostend, in which case British troops will replace the French at Nieuport. The French will take over the Het Sas sector." In conclusion, the Marshal told me that he intended to see General Pétain on Wednesday and to come and see me again later for a further discussion of these plans.It is worth remarking here that it was the statesmen and not the soldiers who from now onwards assumed the direction of operations. The General Staffs had to adapt their methods to political decisions, and to enlighten the politicians on the possibility or impossibility of achieving the objectives assigned to them. The King, moreover, without refusing our co-operation, expressed from the very start the most emphatic reservations as regards the success of the operation planned.
He repeated them to the French C.-in-C.7th June
Conversation with General Pétain.
This is the first time that I have met the new C.-in-C. He made the best possible impression upon me. He affirms that in the present situation a breakthrough is impossible, since the opposing forces on the Western Front are almost equal: 156 divisions on the German side and 181 on the Allied side. I questioned him as to the possibility of a fourth winter of war. He assured me that he could see no possibility of this. "The military chiefs," he added, "must tell the politicians the truth. They have not always done this. Many people are badly informed. This insistence on the offensive has been one of the causes of the enormous French losses." As Generalissimo, he would not entertain proposals of peace being made to an enemy still installed on French and Belgian territory. In view of the gravity of the situation, he had been forced to intervene with the politicians. It was he who had forced the head of the Government to make the speech repudiating the Stockholm manoeuvre. "Had we gone to Stockholm," he said to me, "we should have given the Army a glimpse of peace in the near future. This would have caused an immediate upheaval. There can only be talk of peace after the evacuation of the occupied territories, but it remains to be seen whether these are to include Alsace-Lorraine." The general spoke to me also of the crisis in certain French regiments which had assumed a very serious nature. "The French Army," he said, "is no longer what it was."From the practical point of view it was agreed that the Belgian Army should remain completely and exclusively under the command of His Majesty; that the French divisions would be transferred to the Boesinghe-Drie Grachten sector; that the Belgian Army would try to advance towards Dixmude beyond the Yser as soon as the British Army should have advanced far enough the King was to be the judge of this. The operation in its entirety did not aim at a strategic break-through of the front. It was to form part of the series of attacks on limited objectives which, in General Pétain's words, corresponded to the situation of the opposing forces on the Western Front. The agreement was incorporated in a protocol drawn up the same day between General Pétain, Marshal Haig and our Chief of Staff. It ran as follows: "Offensive operations will be undertaken in Flanders during the course of the summer, with the object of chasing the enemy from the Belgian coast. "The troops taking part will be as follows: three British armies and the First French Army under the orders of Marshal Haig, and the Belgian Army under the orders of His Majesty the King. "The British armies will operate in part from the region of Ypres and in part towards the Belgian coast. "The French Army will operate on the left of the British armies starting from the region of Steenstraet. "The Belgian Army will hold itself in readiness to advance from Dixmude when the Franco-British forces on its right flank have advanced sufficiently to facilitate this operation, i.e. when they have reached the front Etang de Blankaert-Foret d'Houthulst (northern fringe)." I may say this new conception of our participation received the full support of the King. The latter knew, furthermore, from his conversations with our unit commanders, that our troops, both officers and men, weary of the long wait, were longing to attack and would welcome enthusiastically an occasion for distinguishing themselves by some feat of arms.
The same day, after a long preliminary bombardment by a formidable weight of artillery, the Second British Army opened the new Battle of Flanders by capturing the Wytschaete-Messines hills. The same evening it announced that all the objectives had been reached and the capture of 7,000 prisoners and sixty guns. After the capture of Wytschaete Ridge preparations for the offensive were carried out on a large scale. The small area of Flemish soil which had remained inviolate was covered with railway lines, cobbled roads, camps, munition dumps, hospitals and aerodromes. During the first days of July the Fifth British Army took up its position between Hill 60 and Boesinghe; the First French Army between this point and Drie Grachten; the 15th British Corps along the coast and in the Nieuport bridgehead. Three thousand guns supported the attacking front; the French Army alone had brought up goo, including some of the largest calibre. A concentration of squadrons ensured mastery in the air and perfect observation for artillery fire, closely verified by aerial photos. In the region of Mardick a British division carried out practice landings, with a view to which Admiral Bacon in command of the Dover Patrol equipped a flotilla of flat-bottomed landing-craft. The artillery preparations consisted of eight days of counter-battery fire, followed by fifteen days of intensive bombardment, alternated with raids and gas attacks. It goes without saying that the Germans replied as best they could. Their fire sowed devastation and death among the civilian population military targets.
In addition to this the British authorities, in the grip of spy fever, proposed to evacuate the inhabitants of the villages they occupied to France. Such a plan greatly disturbed the Sovereign, who arranged for the local councils to be sounded by his aides-de-camp. From their conversations with the inhabitants they informed him that the latter preferred to perish in the ruins of their houses rather than to emigrate. The King took active steps and insisted that our people should be able to decide freely as to whether they would leave. Furthermore, their Majesties set an example. Faithful to their principle of remaining with their national troops, they left La Panne for the Chalet des Moëres, which was likewise on Belgian soil. Alerted by the appearance of the British at Nieuport and by the infernal din of their artillery, the enemy as early as the 10th July overwhelmed the troops guarding the east bank of the Yser and reduced the bridgehead of Lombardzyde to inoffensive proportions. On our flat meadows, clearly visible from his observation posts, they had missed nothing of the Allied preparations. Reinforcements of artillery, aircraft and troops had reached them. Furthermore, their defence system comprised a host of concrete pill-boxes dispersed among the ruins of houses or the remains of parks and woods. The King realised that all surprise effect had disappeared and that the battle would be a simple test of strengths, that the Allies would relapse into a wearing-down battle of the same type as the Somme. He said to one of his aides: "The British from now onwards are embarking upon a chamfering tactic which will prove very expensive." On the Eastern Front the Russians had begun a great offensive and had once more defeated the Austrians, but their effort rapidly petered out, apparently for ever. No more help was forthcoming from this direction. On the 31st July at dawn the Franco-British went over to the attack from Steenstraet to Warneton. The results immediately showed themselves to be disappointing; the troops advanced a mere mile and the enemy recaptured part of the lost terrain the same day. The torrential rain, which had not ceased for a week, had transformed the battlefield into a morass. A series of minor operations with the support of numerous tanks proved fruitless. Despairing of an advance from Ypres and urged by his Chief of Staff, Marshal Haig proposed on the 9th August that the French and Belgians should overrun the forest of Houthulst from the north. The boldness of this concept, the reverse of that laid down in the protocol of the 8th July, did not escape the notice of the King or of General Anthoine, the shrewd commander of the First French Army. They discussed the matter together in perfect agreement.9th August
General Anthoine agrees that the Forest of Houthulst cannot be taken by frontal attack. In the light of the general situation he showed how the original ideas have been modified according to circumstances and the difficulties which have cropped up. The bad weather has delayed operations considerably. It will be lucky if the English arrive at Staden by mid-September. After this date one can no longer count on the possibility of waging full-scale operations in Flanders. General Anthoine has no reserves at his disposal. He has to live on his means, for General Pétain will not send him any reinforcements. He doubts whether he will be able to establish a line which would allow him to lean on Kippe and the inundations of the Blankaert; he thinks he will be able to reach a line based on those of the Martjevaart. He does not see any possibility in the near future of bringing up his artillery to Merckem. He is going to study a way of preparing with artillery fire his attack on the positions of Woumen and Clerken. Like myself, the General is opposed to the idea of mixing Belgian and French troops in the attack which is to start from Dixmude. Two of our divisions, the 2nd and the 6th, will carry out these offensives. A brigade of the 4th or the 5th will cover the flank of the movement from the moment the first objective is taken. He adds that if the English manage to reach Staden (an even chance) he will advance his left wing by using the 36th Corps towards the Blankaert.After getting contact with London, Marshal Haig changed his mind. On the 16th August the Fifth British Army, with the First French Army on its left flank, tried a new general assault. The Martjevaart was reached; a massive tank formation on the heights of Geluvelt was destroyed at blank range by enemy fire. That was the end of the British offensive for a month. September passed in straightening out and consolidating the battle sector. The stubborn English decided to resume operations on a grand scale from the 10th October. The Belgian Army received advice to be ready to attack on the 25th. The new offensive was launched on the 12th, powerfully staged in depth. Despite the endurance and the bravery of the attacking divisions, the gains were insignificant, so much so that during a stormy meeting held at Cassel on the 14th between Marshal Haig and his army commanders, General Plumer commanding the Second British Army declared it impossible to continue operations except perhaps the capture of Passchendaele; General Gough, in command of the Fifth Army, warned that future advances could not be expected to exceed 400 yards and should take place at intervals of at least four days. As for General Anthoine, he considered that operations were finished provided the Belgian Command agreed with him. This was also the opinion of the King, who thus summed up the situation:17th October
Once more a summer has gone by without military operations bringing any solution. The revolution has been a decisive factor in the disintegration of the Russian Army. Despite the hopes and speeches of the English, French and Belgian socialists, the Eastern Front is disrupted. Abandoning their pledges, succumbing to the disorganisation of their transport and supply services, the Russians are all set for anarchy and famine, possibly the precursors of a separate peace. The French Army, after having passed through an extremely dangerous moral crisis in the months of May and June, has recuperated, chiefly thanks to the courage of General Pétain and his decision to reduce the number and scope of his offensive undertakings. The attack of the 16th April had shaken the men's confidence in their leaders. There were many cases of insubordination and even of revolt. He had to act with energy. It was, above all, the personality of the C.-in-C. which restored calm and confidence in the ranks. The French Army knows today that the principle of offensive for offensive's sake, whatever the situation and the respective strength of the adversaries, has definitely been abandoned. The victorious actions of Verdun and Flanders have buoyed up public opinion. Unfortunately, it has been profoundly affected by the revelation of scandals which have left a stain on the honour of Parliament. What will happen to the morale of the French nation when winter comes, when the present offensives come to a standstill, and when the prospect of a new cycle of twelve months of war will become apparent to the people? The British Army will have furnished the maximum effort in 1917. It has reached the apogee of its power. In the future it can only wane. Now it is the turn of the American Army. Can Great Britain allow the United States to play the decisive role and to determine the outcome of the war to build thousands of ships to this end at the very moment that the British Navy is depleted? Marshal Haig has embarked upon this giant offensive in Flanders at the risk of exhausting the entire British Army. They are at their eighth battle! The weather is becoming quite unfavourable. This operation has been badly staged: a narrow front, and a pivoting movement demanding an advance on the part of the right flank, which could not be realised. Furthermore, the enemy had time to bring all his reserves up to Flanders, as a result of the inaction of the French troops and the growing weakness of the Russian Army. Marshal Haig is supported in his obstinacy by several politicians who look upon his offensive from the standpoint of political advantages, which bear no relationship to the military point of view. Little attention is paid to the voice of his subordinates. The army and corps commanders have expressed their complete scepticism on the results to be obtained by a continuation of the attacks. The position of the Belgian Army is fortunately decided. It is not to attack from Dixmude until after the encirclement of Houthulst by the French as far as the Blankaert and by the English as far as Stadenberg. Now the latter will not reach Stadenberg this year, while from now onwards the terrain forbids any operations to the east of the Blankaert on the part of the French. In front of Dixmude the terrain is becoming impracticable.On the supposition that our troops succeeded in conquering the Dixmude-Clerken bastion, to maintain them there during the winter, with a marsh on each flank and the Yser in their rear, would have been to lead them into a death-trap. The King, who realised this, was delighted that this possibility had now been removed. As for Marshal Haig, he continued for a month with his hammer blows, which admittedly caused severe losses to the enemy but took an equally heavy tribute from the British troops. On the 5th November the energy of the Canadians enabled them to get a foothold in the ruins of Passchendaele, which brought to a close the most bloody battle of the war. At this time general attention was transferred to the Italian war front. In less than seventy-two hours the Austro-Germans breached the Caporetto sector, crossed the barrier of the Alps and streamed down into the Tagliamento Valley. Under the threat of being flung into the Adriatic, the Italian Army took hasty refuge behind the Piave. In response to Marshal Cadorna's appeal, French and English divisions left for Italy. The King concluded:10th November
Hardly had the echo of the speeches in which British and French statesmen reaffirmed their conviction of victory died away than we learned in quick succession of the attack and the break-through on the Italian front. The retreat of the Italian Army soon assumed the proportions of a disaster: 200,000 prisoners, 1,800 guns and the passage of the Tagliamento forced. The situation of the Allies has been greatly compromised by this defeat, or rather by this rout of the forces of one of the great Powers of the coalition. One must look for the causes for the breaking of the Italian soldiers' fighting spirit in the weariness resulting from the length of the war, in the losses suffered in the recent offensives and in defeatist propaganda. The morale of an army must be very carefully assessed. There are traditional virtues just as there are lacunae in the military character of races. The Italian Command was not unaware of the weaknesses of its troops. It always feared a great enemy offensive and asked for Franco-British reinforcements in view of such an eventuality. The Allies neglected these wise warnings. On the contrary, they demanded continual attacks by the Italian Army. The mistake made by General Cadorna was in giving way to these demands, and wearing down the weak morale of his units in very costly offensives which were unlikely to achieve a decisive result. The Entente is paying more and more dearly for its mistakes. Will its leaders ever open their eyes? They are faced with a terrible dilemma. The day will come when the exhausted peoples will see in revolution the only remedy for their ills and the only means of putting a stop to the war.In actual fact, in Petrograd on the 7th the Bolshe vists proclaimed the "Soviet State" and urged the belligerents to start negotiations immediately for peace without annexations or indemnities. The letter in the Daily Telegraph, too, in which Lord Lansdowne made an appeal for peace, provoked the following comment: 30th November Lord Lansdowne's peace letter. This has caused a great scandal in the camp of the partisans of War to the Death, but it was a fine act of courage on the part of a wise and experienced statesman, who has rendered great services to his country. Lord Northcliffe and The Times almost had apoplectic strokes. General Pétain's visit was an opportunity for discovering the opinion of the French C.-in-C.10th December
General Pétain is not satisfied with the general situation; it has never been worse. He believes that the Italians will not hold if strong pressure is brought to bear on their left flank. He declares that the British Army is very tired; that the British Command will not agree to relieving the Third French Army; that the French armies drawn out on a 360-mile front run the risk of being broken if they are suddenly subjected to a large-scale attack. The depots are bare-except for the new class and a few men who are reported fit again. The morale of the troops is good, but they are incapable of large and sustained effort. Clemenceau is popular and will remain in power if things go well. The General deplores the inefficiency of the British Command. The troops are excellent but they have been clumsily used. The Americans lack discipline and experience. Their baptism of fire will probably cost them dear. In conclusion, the General considers that the moment is not ripe for making peace, but if the enemy in a few months' time makes any proposals he thinks that they should be carefully examined.In the midst of all this, the position of the Sovereign was proving very difficult. Through the services of M. Coppéc, Comte de Broqueville agreed to contact M. van der Lancken, Governor of occupied Belgium. These exchanges, entered into with the knowledge of the French Government, constituted merely a quest for information. Nevertheless, they infuriated certain of our ministers. Although the Sovereign considered the moment unripe for negotiations, he understood what was in the Premier's mind, and noted in his diary:15th December
I am of the opinion that it is the duty of governments to obtain all information on the enemy's dispositions. The conflict should not continue a single day after war aims have been achieved, taking into account the great suffering which war inflicts on all peoples and in particular on the Belgian people. Now, in order to be certain that these aims have been achieved, one must have information. Accordingly, when an enemy personality of sufficient qualifications presents himself to make a declaration, after assuring oneself of his credentials, he should be given a hearing by an unprejudiced party of the same rank or in an equivalent position, naturally in agreement with the Allied Governments.The King realised, nevertheless, that in the Government two different policies existed, which M. de Broqueville himself defined as follows: "that of prudence, expectation and acceptable compromise; and that of diehard, chauvinistic death or glory". With the idea of appeasement and peace in mind, the King agreed to a change of government, placing M. Cooreman at the head of the Cabinet, M. de Broqueville in charge of Economic Affairs, and M. Hymans in the Foreign Office. After conferring with the latter, the King notes his satisfaction at his new minister's reasonable views.17th December
M. Hymans will keep me informed of everything that goes on in his department. He agrees with me that we must not make a pronouncement at the moment on the future state of Belgium. No customs union with France. If events take a disturbing turn he admits that the Government should insist upon the Great Powers examining the methods of bringing to a close a war whose length threatens to ruin the social structure everywhere. The example of Russia is full of dangers.The CAMPAIGN OF 1918
The Belgian Army, in excellent fettle, takes over the Nieuport sector again-Visit to the Italian front-The Flemish question in the Army-The question of informatory contacts with the enemy-German superiority on the Western Front-Alerting of the Army in the event of an enemy offensive-The fortified camp of the Yser and the coast of the Pas de Calais must be defended at all costs-The steps taken in London-England agrees- German offensive of the 21st March-The offensive in Flanders-The battle of Merckem-Quarrel over a unified command-The King upholds the principle of "concerted and common action"-The visit of the Sovereigns to the Grand Fleet-The session of the War Committee Solemn occasion at the Albert Hall-Threat of a new attack in Flanders-German offensive in Champagne-The reply-The initiative goes over to the Allies-The King suggests a large-scale raid on Dixmude- Marshal Foch's great offensive-The King Commander-in-Chief of the Army groups in Flanders-The offensive of liberation-The return of the Sovereigns to Brussels-The King renders account to the representatives of the nation.
1918 found the Belgian Army in excellent fettle, both in material and from the point of view of morale. The troops had experienced a great battle, had undergone the most violent bombardments and taken the measure of the enemy in the course of raids and counter-attacks. They knew that in future they would be in a position to fight on terms of equality of armament. Our forces were reorganised into twelve infantry divisions and one cavalry division-with weak effectives, it is true, and almost without reserves in the depots. Our sapper units were excellent and well equipped, the heavy artillery satisfactory, and our aviation well equipped and full of spirits. In February, in agreement with General Pétain, we relieved the French troops in the Nieuport sector. In this way a desire which had long been nursed by the King was realised: with its flank on the sea, the Belgian Army held the extreme left of the Western Front. Its sector stretched over eighteen miles. During the first days of the same month, in reply to an invitation from King Victor Emmanuel, the King paid a visit to the Italian front. On the 2nd February, at 8 p.m., we left Paris, arriving at Mentone at 8 p.m. on the 3rd. February 5th, at 8 p.m., we left Ventimiglia and arrived at Battaglia, near Padua, on the 6th February at 8.30 a.m. On the morning of the 6th we were installed in a Venetian villa. During the afternoon a review and march-past of four battalions of Bersaglieri, an artillery battery and a squadron of dismounted cavalry; a visit to the Air Force. My impression was good, the superior officers and generals are young and go-ahead. They have character. The troops look well, and so do the airmen.7th February
Visit to the Pasubio sector in the Alps.
We climbed more than 6,000 feet. Large-scale opera- tions are hardly possible there. We noticed the fine work which had been carried out on the roads and the communications. On our return, near Santa Caterina, we saw a practice attack by an assault battalion which was not very impressive.8th February
Visit to the defences of Venice, the Piave front and the Adriatic.
A detachment of sailors marched past; they seemed a trifle undisciplined.9th February
Visit to the Asiago sector at a height of nearly 4,500 feet.
In this terrain, both infantry and field artillery can manoeuvre comfortably. It is a sector for attack, and one can understand the Austrian operations of June 1916.
As a general impression, I thought that the Italian Army was more disciplined than ours. The troops looked better and the convoys marched in good order. They did not, however, possess the perfection of the British troops. Nevertheless, it appears that if they were properly used, the Italian troops should fight well.10th February
Arrived at Mentone at 11.30 a.m.
On his return to Moëres, the King busied himself with the unrest which had broken out since the beginning of winter among certain regiments in the form of sudden and noisy manifestations on the part of Flemish soldiers in favour of linguistic claims. The men roved in bands round the barracks maintaining that they wanted to be given orders in their own language. Pamphlets and inscriptions were circulated to the same end, all reflecting a national and religious mysticism encouraged, if not fermented, by the chaplains and stretcher-bearers, not to mention war-weariness and a certain animosity against France. Enquiries and arrests proved that those taking part were nearly always combatants, irreproachable under fire, who could be appeased by the promise of the post-war creation of Flemish regiments and a Flemish university. Two Council meetings on the King's initiative showed that the Government was divided on the matter of conceding such far-reaching reforms. During March the inertia of the authorities brought about a repetition of these manifestations amongst certain of the troops. The King accordingly convened the Council once more, whose deliberations he relates as follows:20th March
The question of the day is the Fleming in the Army.
We read the findings of the two last Councils held at Houthem at the beginning of February. We thus managed, in the light of all that had already been said, to avoid a further general discussion. I declared that I only intended to hold a morning session and that the Government would have to come to an agreement on a solution. I concluded by showing the necessity for giving the Flemings a proof of the Government's goodwill and the possibility of doing so, since from the minutes of the last Council there seemed to exist a basis for agreement among the ministers, particularly in the domain of education. The Chief of Staff was asked to read a report on the agitation among the troops. In his speech he maintained that a complete organisation of the movement existed among the front-line units; but that so far the manifestations had not been of a violent nature, and the police hoped to find the centre of this propaganda. He added that the situation could become serious, but that he was firmly resolved to maintain discipline. He continued to think that the origin of the agitation was frivolous and exclusively the work of a few intellectuals. M. Van der Vijvere protested the use of the word 'frivolous'; the movement had its roots in the deepest feelings of the race. MM. Hymans and Vandervelde stressed the need for rigid discipline but admitted that the Flemings had the right to certain cultural privileges. They agreed that the question as a whole should be submitted to a commission on condition that another was formed at the same time to look into the question of revision and another into the educational question. M. Renkin was of the same opinion. I observed that certain ministers were under an illusion if they thought it possible to impose upon the Belgian Army a discipline as rigorous as that to be found among the French and British troops. One could not dream of having recourse to repression without having previously given some sign of goodwill to the Flemings. The Chief of Staff insisted that he would never allow Belgian soldiers to fire on their comrades; that every repressive means must be exhausted before reaching that point. M. Segers proposed three things: Flemish schools for officers and N.C.O.s; a committee, to be composed of politicians or officials, to control the use of languages in the Army; and a Commission to study the Flemish question. The schools for officers and N.C.O.s were acceptable to the Council; the Control Committee was also acceptable, but it was to be composed only of soldiers appointed by royal decree. The Minister for War accepted this formula. As for the Commission, after a lively debate in which MM. Hymans and Renkin took part, it was decided to create simultaneously three commissions: Flemish, revision and educational. The idea of a declaration or royal proclamation to the Army was opposed by MM. Renkin, Vandervelde and Hymans. A few ministers suggested that I should profit by the recent military events to address a manifesto to the troops, praising their fine conduct. M. Segers considered that a few remarks on the Flemish element in the Army should be included. I replied that six months ago I had been in favour of a proclamation dealing with linguistic differences, but that today I was opposed to a glorification of our military achievements. The situation of the Army is critical; the enemy is very powerful; we can be attacked in the near future, and can only count on ourselves. It would not be opportune to raise our voice loudly on the subject of events which might only be the prelude to more important actions, or to use a language the enemy might consider a provocation.In the course of the same Council M. Hymans read the instructions he had sent to our minister in Berne, laying down the attitude he should adopt towards Count Toring, who, on the initiative of the German Government, had requested a meeting with him. These instructions implied so arrogant an attitude on the part of the messenger who was none other than the Queen's brother-in-law that the King was shocked by them.Our Minister for Foreign Affairs and our politicians seem to have lost touch with reality. What, in fact, is the situation? Might is on the side of the Germans. Opposite our front, in contrast to the situation we have been faced with since 1914, Germany has grouped several excellent divisions. Moreover, she has given us proof of this. For a month we have suffered important losses. On the 18th March alone we lost 1,100 men. We must not deceive ourselves; the enemy is in a position to teach us a lesson whenever he likes. It is a mistake to count too much on military aid from the Allies, for in fact what aid they could bring us would be weak and tardy. Our politicians adopt a haughty and provocative attitude towards Germany, and the Army bears the brunt. Let us suppose that in our interests the German delegate has arrived with the intention of advising us to use a more moderate language. If our minister at Berne behaves "coldly and distantly" to him, if he is contemptuous, if he follows the instructions he has been given, the delegate will withdraw, convinced of the need to administer us a rap over the knuckles. This blustering attitude will be paid for by the soldier. It is invariably upon him and upon the people that the faults of the leaders fall. Of course, as long as our country is occupied we cannot lay down our arms, but if our war aims were achieved, if it were duly established that our claims would be satisfied and we could never be sure of this without confirmation our Army could wage a special type of warfare designed to spare the blood of our soldiers. Any provocative statements might be expensive for him.
Part 5