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Old Timey Fightin'- Advanced FAQ!
13 years ago
A while back I posted a journal called "Old Timey Fightin'- an FAQ", which was a fairly broad profile of social and military trends in the Napoleonic era, trying to demystify the common practices more commonly thought to be strange or insane.
(that journal is here, for the curious --> http://www.furaffinity.net/journal/1708056/ )
This is sort of a continuation, if you will, answering more in-depth and precise questions for anyone potentially curious.
Q: I've come across mention of 'lines' versus 'columns'. What are these, exactly, and why are they important?
A: Roughly up until the rise of Napoleon, most nations in Europe (and to a degree, the Americas) fought and marched into battle primarily in battle lines. This was so widespread that the common foot soldiers came to be called 'line infantry'. In brief, a disciplined line of soldiers could present the greatest potential firepower against the enemy without presenting many weak points. Even so, lines had significant weaknesses, most specifically that they could be flanked and broken apart if hit from the sides. Lines were also difficult to maneuver, as hills, marshes, obstacles, trees, and even tall grass could slow down and disorganize an advance. As such, for most of the 17th and 18th centuries line infantry combat in the field was a matter of attempting to turn the enemy's flanks, then attack them.
Napoleon's star rose at about the same time that tactics were changing. Faced with the threat of Revolutionary France and its large armies, France's rivals deployed ever larger forces in the field. To compensate, the French threw more men at the problem as well. This resulted in ever larger armies taking the field. Napoleon took advantage of the situation by using columns to attack, rather than taking time to always form into battle lines. Columns are formations that are generally rectangular in shape, and longer than they are broad. Such concentrations of men could smash through even disciplined lines of battle by weight of their numbers, but like lines columns also had their weaknesses. Columns, being tightly packed rectangles of soldiers, were big targets for artillery and disciplined musketeers. Also, being narrower, columns couldn't match the firepower of lines. Thus, in many situations there were duels between columns and lines, with line infantry struggling to slow down and break apart columns before they could close in and smash through, and columns struggling to close with the enemy as quickly as possible while keeping the formation intact.
Q: How did cavalry beat infantry, and how did infantry protect themselves from cavalry?
A: Cavalry of the period were in most cases very different than the knights of the medieval and renaissance periods. With the exception of elite units like the cuirassiers, most horsemen did not wear armor and relied on speed, surprise, and the weight of the charge to ride down enemy soldiers. Cavaliers often made full use of their speed and impact to tumble enemy battalions, regiments, and even full armies into ruin. Lacking any armor of their own, infantrymen were often at the mercy of enemy cavalry if they arrived intact and struck from behind of in the flanks. Cavalry were also exceptional at silencing enemy artillery crews, disrupting communications, and cutting units off from one another, sowing confusion into the enemy's ranks.
Infantry had two primary answers to cavalry charges: The Bayonet and the Square Formation. Bayonets were not new in the Napoleonic Age. Their purpose was simple: turn every musketeer into a spearman to fight off the cavalry. Though a single soldier with a bayonet was often no match for a horseman with a saber, a group of disciplined men standing shoulder to shoulder, each with a fixed bayonet, would be very difficult for a horseman to overcome. The square formation broke a line of infantry into four sections, then turned them into a square with all guns and bayonets pointed outward. This formation was immobile and purely defensive in nature, but very effective against cavalry because horsemen could neither flank nor attack the rear of such a formation.
Q: Why fight in formations, anyway?
A: It is difficult to comprehend warfare of the Napoleonic Era in the context of modern warfare. Today's emphasis is on small, cohesive, offense-oriented units of men with enormous individual firepower and access to armor, air, and artillery support, meaning that concentrating a lot of men in a small area is a recipe for disaster. At the time, however, the offensive power of the individual soldier was very limited. In order to present the enemy with a credible threat it was necessary to bring many soldiers to battle, and the only way to move those soldiers effectively was in formations.
Formations solve a number of problems. First, the close proximity of so many soldiers improved morale-- the instinct of safety in numbers. Second, formations give forces with large numbers of soldiers combat effectiveness. Third, formations like columns were easier to maneuver quickly over long distances, often along roads, a quality that saved Napoleon himself many times. Fourth, formations prevented ill-discipline-- whether they wanted to or not, many soldiers were trapped within the formation and left with no recourse but to fight. Finally, formations were an important traditional part of martial discipline and war well before the Napoleonic Era, and traditions have a way of being carried on.
Q: What was/is the Corps System?
A: The Corps System revolutionized the way that armies fight, especially in the West. To this day, part of Napoleon's military legacy can be seen in the way that many militaries are organized. But what is it, exactly?
Prior to the Corps System, militaries were organized primarily into regiments, each with its own specialty, usually led by a colonel. A general had the singular authority over a very large number of men and units, but each regiment existed as a separate part and the army would only be functional or complete if all the regiments worked in concert.
An Army Corps, by contrast, divides an army into smaller fighting forces, each with its own infantry, cavalry, and artillery assets. Each Corps had its own general, and while these generals were subordinate to a commander in chief, they had more independence and flexibility than traditional armies. A Corps could defend against superior numbers or contribute its assets toward a major offensive. In a sense, by dividing the army and its authority it became much stronger. While many Corps often had combat specialties, each was capable of reacting and adapting to any given situation at any time. This proved immensely powerful to Napoleon, and many of his greatest victories can be attributed to it.
Q: What was a Grand Battery?
A: Simply put, a Grand Battery was the concentration of an entire army's artillery assets into a single area with the intention of bombarding the everloving crap out of some unfortunate part of the enemy army. Napoleon used this tactic to soften up or blast holes in the enemy army, and it carried its own risks- concentrating all the artillery in one place deprives other units of much-needed artillery support. It was mainly used as an offensive strategy, and it didn't always work- General Robert E. Lee attempted it at the Battle of Gettysburg prior to the ill-fated Pickett's Charge. Despite that one bad example, it was at times an astonishingly effective strategy.
Q: Where does the term "Dragoon" come from?
A: Dragoons were mounted infantrymen that specialized in rapid deployment, and the name comes from the type of musket they originally carried, a shortened muzzle-loader called a 'Dragon'. Dragoons began as soldiers trained in both riding and infantry combat, but gradually became more traditional light cavalry units as the use of firearms by cavaliers became more prevalent. To this day, dragoon units are employed as rapid response forces, though their mounts of choice are generally armored vehicles now.
Q: How did Ambulances and Triage change warfare?
A: Ambulances, combined with field hospitals and the practice of Triage, weren't simply added to armies of the time out of a sense of altruism and humanity, although those are certainly important factors to consider. Though the evolution of Battlefield Medicine was gradual, up until the Napoleonic Wars it was a fairly disorganized affair carried out by volunteers, soldiers, and the local populace. Without a systematic method of saving the wounded or burying the dead, armies were doomed to take many unnecessary casualties even without fighting.
Designated Ambulance drivers/runners were vital in the collection of wounded from the battlefield even in the midst of fighting, and through their rapid responsiveness soldiers could be carried to safety and shelter, greatly increasing their chances of survival. Napoleon's surgeon general, Dominique Jean Larrey, developed the Triage System, the organization of treatment options for various degrees of wounding. By reserving the most intensive care for those with the greatest need for it and categorizing the wounded, many lives were saved and many soldiers returned to duty in good time. Eventually, battlefield medicine became an important facet of all Western militaries for the preservation of troop morale, fighting effectiveness, and public support.
Q: What determined the quality of a fighting unit?
A: Many of the same factors that determine fighting effectiveness today applied equally to soldiers of the Napoleonic Era. The quality of equipment, the quality of food, and the number of effective fighting men vs. invalids in a unit were important factors. In some instances, the quality of weapons made a difference, though most muskets performed roughly equally in combat. Training was vital, but in contrast to classroom smarts, obstacle courses, co-reliance exercises, and tests of leadership the key training utensil of the era was drill. A thoroughly drilled unit could be counted on to competently follow instructions and fire upon the enemy in spite of hellish combat conditions. An individual's personal initiative and attitude were less important than their ability to follow instructions to the letter and without question. This was a habit that proved hard to break when military tactics began to shift towards smaller, cohesive units centered around non-commissioned officers. The quality of officers also had a tremendous effect on fighting effectiveness, and competent, confident commanders were highly sought after in contrast to veteran soldiers. Despite the general focus on higher-echelon leadership, nations did raise 'elite' units whose troops were selected not upon social standing, but combat experience and proven bravery. However, many 'guard' units were in fact decorative and inexperienced units kept well away from actual fighting since they were populated by the children of the nobility and upper-middle classes, and not as effective in combat as one might imagine.
(that journal is here, for the curious --> http://www.furaffinity.net/journal/1708056/ )
This is sort of a continuation, if you will, answering more in-depth and precise questions for anyone potentially curious.
Q: I've come across mention of 'lines' versus 'columns'. What are these, exactly, and why are they important?
A: Roughly up until the rise of Napoleon, most nations in Europe (and to a degree, the Americas) fought and marched into battle primarily in battle lines. This was so widespread that the common foot soldiers came to be called 'line infantry'. In brief, a disciplined line of soldiers could present the greatest potential firepower against the enemy without presenting many weak points. Even so, lines had significant weaknesses, most specifically that they could be flanked and broken apart if hit from the sides. Lines were also difficult to maneuver, as hills, marshes, obstacles, trees, and even tall grass could slow down and disorganize an advance. As such, for most of the 17th and 18th centuries line infantry combat in the field was a matter of attempting to turn the enemy's flanks, then attack them.
Napoleon's star rose at about the same time that tactics were changing. Faced with the threat of Revolutionary France and its large armies, France's rivals deployed ever larger forces in the field. To compensate, the French threw more men at the problem as well. This resulted in ever larger armies taking the field. Napoleon took advantage of the situation by using columns to attack, rather than taking time to always form into battle lines. Columns are formations that are generally rectangular in shape, and longer than they are broad. Such concentrations of men could smash through even disciplined lines of battle by weight of their numbers, but like lines columns also had their weaknesses. Columns, being tightly packed rectangles of soldiers, were big targets for artillery and disciplined musketeers. Also, being narrower, columns couldn't match the firepower of lines. Thus, in many situations there were duels between columns and lines, with line infantry struggling to slow down and break apart columns before they could close in and smash through, and columns struggling to close with the enemy as quickly as possible while keeping the formation intact.
Q: How did cavalry beat infantry, and how did infantry protect themselves from cavalry?
A: Cavalry of the period were in most cases very different than the knights of the medieval and renaissance periods. With the exception of elite units like the cuirassiers, most horsemen did not wear armor and relied on speed, surprise, and the weight of the charge to ride down enemy soldiers. Cavaliers often made full use of their speed and impact to tumble enemy battalions, regiments, and even full armies into ruin. Lacking any armor of their own, infantrymen were often at the mercy of enemy cavalry if they arrived intact and struck from behind of in the flanks. Cavalry were also exceptional at silencing enemy artillery crews, disrupting communications, and cutting units off from one another, sowing confusion into the enemy's ranks.
Infantry had two primary answers to cavalry charges: The Bayonet and the Square Formation. Bayonets were not new in the Napoleonic Age. Their purpose was simple: turn every musketeer into a spearman to fight off the cavalry. Though a single soldier with a bayonet was often no match for a horseman with a saber, a group of disciplined men standing shoulder to shoulder, each with a fixed bayonet, would be very difficult for a horseman to overcome. The square formation broke a line of infantry into four sections, then turned them into a square with all guns and bayonets pointed outward. This formation was immobile and purely defensive in nature, but very effective against cavalry because horsemen could neither flank nor attack the rear of such a formation.
Q: Why fight in formations, anyway?
A: It is difficult to comprehend warfare of the Napoleonic Era in the context of modern warfare. Today's emphasis is on small, cohesive, offense-oriented units of men with enormous individual firepower and access to armor, air, and artillery support, meaning that concentrating a lot of men in a small area is a recipe for disaster. At the time, however, the offensive power of the individual soldier was very limited. In order to present the enemy with a credible threat it was necessary to bring many soldiers to battle, and the only way to move those soldiers effectively was in formations.
Formations solve a number of problems. First, the close proximity of so many soldiers improved morale-- the instinct of safety in numbers. Second, formations give forces with large numbers of soldiers combat effectiveness. Third, formations like columns were easier to maneuver quickly over long distances, often along roads, a quality that saved Napoleon himself many times. Fourth, formations prevented ill-discipline-- whether they wanted to or not, many soldiers were trapped within the formation and left with no recourse but to fight. Finally, formations were an important traditional part of martial discipline and war well before the Napoleonic Era, and traditions have a way of being carried on.
Q: What was/is the Corps System?
A: The Corps System revolutionized the way that armies fight, especially in the West. To this day, part of Napoleon's military legacy can be seen in the way that many militaries are organized. But what is it, exactly?
Prior to the Corps System, militaries were organized primarily into regiments, each with its own specialty, usually led by a colonel. A general had the singular authority over a very large number of men and units, but each regiment existed as a separate part and the army would only be functional or complete if all the regiments worked in concert.
An Army Corps, by contrast, divides an army into smaller fighting forces, each with its own infantry, cavalry, and artillery assets. Each Corps had its own general, and while these generals were subordinate to a commander in chief, they had more independence and flexibility than traditional armies. A Corps could defend against superior numbers or contribute its assets toward a major offensive. In a sense, by dividing the army and its authority it became much stronger. While many Corps often had combat specialties, each was capable of reacting and adapting to any given situation at any time. This proved immensely powerful to Napoleon, and many of his greatest victories can be attributed to it.
Q: What was a Grand Battery?
A: Simply put, a Grand Battery was the concentration of an entire army's artillery assets into a single area with the intention of bombarding the everloving crap out of some unfortunate part of the enemy army. Napoleon used this tactic to soften up or blast holes in the enemy army, and it carried its own risks- concentrating all the artillery in one place deprives other units of much-needed artillery support. It was mainly used as an offensive strategy, and it didn't always work- General Robert E. Lee attempted it at the Battle of Gettysburg prior to the ill-fated Pickett's Charge. Despite that one bad example, it was at times an astonishingly effective strategy.
Q: Where does the term "Dragoon" come from?
A: Dragoons were mounted infantrymen that specialized in rapid deployment, and the name comes from the type of musket they originally carried, a shortened muzzle-loader called a 'Dragon'. Dragoons began as soldiers trained in both riding and infantry combat, but gradually became more traditional light cavalry units as the use of firearms by cavaliers became more prevalent. To this day, dragoon units are employed as rapid response forces, though their mounts of choice are generally armored vehicles now.
Q: How did Ambulances and Triage change warfare?
A: Ambulances, combined with field hospitals and the practice of Triage, weren't simply added to armies of the time out of a sense of altruism and humanity, although those are certainly important factors to consider. Though the evolution of Battlefield Medicine was gradual, up until the Napoleonic Wars it was a fairly disorganized affair carried out by volunteers, soldiers, and the local populace. Without a systematic method of saving the wounded or burying the dead, armies were doomed to take many unnecessary casualties even without fighting.
Designated Ambulance drivers/runners were vital in the collection of wounded from the battlefield even in the midst of fighting, and through their rapid responsiveness soldiers could be carried to safety and shelter, greatly increasing their chances of survival. Napoleon's surgeon general, Dominique Jean Larrey, developed the Triage System, the organization of treatment options for various degrees of wounding. By reserving the most intensive care for those with the greatest need for it and categorizing the wounded, many lives were saved and many soldiers returned to duty in good time. Eventually, battlefield medicine became an important facet of all Western militaries for the preservation of troop morale, fighting effectiveness, and public support.
Q: What determined the quality of a fighting unit?
A: Many of the same factors that determine fighting effectiveness today applied equally to soldiers of the Napoleonic Era. The quality of equipment, the quality of food, and the number of effective fighting men vs. invalids in a unit were important factors. In some instances, the quality of weapons made a difference, though most muskets performed roughly equally in combat. Training was vital, but in contrast to classroom smarts, obstacle courses, co-reliance exercises, and tests of leadership the key training utensil of the era was drill. A thoroughly drilled unit could be counted on to competently follow instructions and fire upon the enemy in spite of hellish combat conditions. An individual's personal initiative and attitude were less important than their ability to follow instructions to the letter and without question. This was a habit that proved hard to break when military tactics began to shift towards smaller, cohesive units centered around non-commissioned officers. The quality of officers also had a tremendous effect on fighting effectiveness, and competent, confident commanders were highly sought after in contrast to veteran soldiers. Despite the general focus on higher-echelon leadership, nations did raise 'elite' units whose troops were selected not upon social standing, but combat experience and proven bravery. However, many 'guard' units were in fact decorative and inexperienced units kept well away from actual fighting since they were populated by the children of the nobility and upper-middle classes, and not as effective in combat as one might imagine.
By the way, do you know anything about what kind of military tactics were used by Ottomans and Safavids during ths time frame? All I can find about their tactics are of 17th century.... Perhaps they stagnated militaristically as China and other northeast asian societies did?
The Ottomans struggled to modernize their military in the midst of a growing debt crisis- the Ottoman Empire had been hard-wired for expansion, and when it ceased to expand its tax system began to falter. Most historians put the beginning of the sharp decline in the early 1700s. The Ottomans still had Janissaries up until about 1824, when they were forcibly dismantled and replaced by a more modern military. Throughout the Napoleonic Age the Ottomans generally tried to stay out of the conflict and protect their frontiers, but they had much bigger problems on the horizon, like the Greek, Macedonian, Albanian, Bulgarian, and Romanian independence movements. The Ottomans had a somewhat more conservative method of fighting at the time, with a preference for the sword as opposed to the bayonet and a strong emphasis on individual warrior prowess rather than unit cohesion. They had a small core of professional soldiers and many 'auxiliaries', part-time troops and in some cases mercenary bandits who theoretically supported the Ottoman Army. In reality, many of these auxiliaries were very poor in combat- conscript peasants had little to no military discipline while bandits took great lengths to avoid face-to-face confrontations with enemy forces. Ottoman professional units were good in quality, but insufficient in number.
The Safavid Empire must have had a military structure similar to that of the Ottoman Empire, something more medieval in nature centered around a small number of highly professional troops supported by militias, levys, conscripts, or auxiliaries. They fought with the Ottomans and Uzbeks regularly, and as a result must have had a degree of modernity. From what I read, the Safavids struggled with persistent conflicts with their neighbors and economic strangulation thanks to the aggression of the Dutch and British East Empire Companies. They had a large body of musketeers and a designated artillery corps, but much of the artillery was not manufactured in Persia and was imported, subjecting the Safavids to an unfortunate reliance on foreign arms and expertise.
Both the Ottomans and Safavids, as well as many other nations in the world, were reluctant to raise mass armies conscripted from the national population. There was always a persistent fear that arming the peasantry would result in the overthrow of the aristocracy and/or monarchy, and as a result the majority of armies stayed small and professional. In a sense, this is where the Asiatic armies start to stagnate while Westerners begin to reshape and redefine the nature of warfare around the world.
By the way, may I ask another question? After reading the part that you mentioned it's highly probable that most eastern nations had infantries fighting in line formations, I became curious whether that was the case in Korea too.... So I looked up for Joseon dynasty formations and found this, which it's author says is re-drawn version of this. Could this formation be considered as a line formation? The blue characters mean arquebusiers, purple characters melee infantry, green characters calvary, and red characters officers.
Having a second line also enabled some tactical flexibility- troops in the reserve or second echelon could be redeployed at a moment's notice to counter, say, an enemy cavalry charge.
Officers are distributed fairly evenly across the formation for one reason: Visibility. Being able to see the commanders and the unit colors was essential for a battle line to determine where it was supposed to be. This is why it was considered a great honor to capture colors-- it signifies that an enemy unit has lost its command and guidance and is neutralized. This was pretty much the norm throughout the world, even if the definition of 'colors' varied.
As for Jared Diamond's theory, it's tempting to apply it to Eastern cultures as well as the Americas, but it may not necessarily apply. True, Eurasian cultures would eventually rise to dominate global politics, but Diamond primarily argues that three factors determined the advantages of westerners: Weaponry, Biology, and Political Power. Asiatic nation-states were neither at a technological nor a biological disadvantage to Eurasians-- Western weapons did not generally reign supreme over Eastern designs and Western diseases did not generally ravage Eastern populations. The rise of agriculture began earlier in the East than the West, and theoretically this should have put the East at a great advantage in international affairs. Instead, I believe that the East was slow to appreciate modernization due to an underestimation of foreign influence and general political weaknesses. Unlike in the Americas, Europeans were generally thought of as inferiors to Eastern cultures, relative children in the affairs of history and the world. This hubris, particularly in the upper echelons of Asiatic society, was most likely their key weakness, and Europeans exploited this ruthlessly.
I was thinking about his theory on the cause of Great Divergence between European nations and Asian nations. If I have correctly understood what he wrote, he says that unlike Europe, where its geography enabled multiple states to exist and thus caused constant conflict and pressure to progress among them, geography of Asia made it possible for stable large empires to establish, which were prone to stagnate in order to protect the interests of their aristocrats.
I find it quite amusing that that Joseon dynasty people came up with similar solution for the use of small arms. I guess sometimes people bring up similar solutions for similar circumstances.... Any way, thank you very much for taking time to answer my questions. I think I learnt a lot from you. Thanks again!